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This dissertation is a collection of three essays about public policy coordina-
tion. Although the subject and the issues analyzed in each essay are different,
the bottom lines are similar, namely evaluating empirical performance of New
Keynesian approach in explaining the economic variables behavior in emerg-
ing economies. Literatures for this approach are extensive but mostly focused
on developed countries and researches on emerging countries are still in begin-
ning stage. Therefore, these essays are an effort to narrow that gap
First chapter, as a starting point, develops of simple calibrated closed econ-
omy approach in the spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999) where financial interme-
diaries, entrepreneurs and households are subject to credit constraint as well
as default probability; including real and nominal rigidities, thus both mone-
tary and macro prudential policies can play a role to minimize those frictions
and rigidities. We find that with the introduction of a macro prudential rule
such as dynamic capital requirement and loan-to-value rules would help in re-
ducing macroeconomic volatility and improving social welfare. However, the
effects of macro prudential regulations tend to bemodest and numericallymuch
smaller than those achieved when the central bank implements monetary pol-
icy rules that are close to the optimal one. Given the situation in Indonesia, that
macro prudential regulator will be under an independent financial supervisory
body, as long as that regulator has an objective to minimize the volatility of
credit/GDP to avoid the buildup of excessive risks, macro prudential policies
become quantitatively more important.
The second chapter based on premise that monetary policy has played a
prominent stabilization role inmany countries during the global financial crises,
but fiscal policy has been seen as either sub-optimal or less effective. There has
been renewed interest in fiscal policy in small open economies such as the UK
and European periphery where austerity took place amidst low inflation and
accompanied by internal or external imbalances. In an emerging economy, a
larger expected share of nonRicardian agents and extent of real and nominal
rigidities would be expected to create a larger potential role for fiscal policy in
macro-economic stabilization and strengthening the resilience of the economy.
Since we focused on monetary and fiscal policy only, there is no financial fric-
tion here but instead we developed a small open economy model. The model
is estimated for the Indonesian economy, using a Bayesian approach to explore
the role of fiscal policy in the existence of nonRicardian households. The model
also features sticky prices and wages, nonRicardian agents and tax distortions
to explore (i) the potential role for fiscal policy in stabilization, and (ii) monetary
policy and fiscal policy interaction more generally. We found that fiscal policy
does contribute to macroeconomic stabilization in Indonesia with its counter-
cyclical policy in terms of fiscal expenditure and a tax response to debt that
ensures solvency. However, fiscal policy should thanks to a large estimated
share of nonRicardians households because they create an important role for
fiscal policy, while price and wage rigidities and distortionary taxes are not.
The fiscal debt also plays an important shock absorber role, allowing active fis-
cal stabilization and absorption of exchange rate valuation effects on the stocks
of debt and reserves.
In the third chapter, we assessed the problem of large and persistent global
imbalances in the recent years that have changed the behavior of capital flows
across countries, particularly in the emerging market. After the global financial
crisis in the late 2000s, the emerging market has experienced massive capital in-
flows due to the strong countercyclical policy in the advanced economy. These
inflows lead to excessive credit growth and booms in asset prices in the emerg-
ing market, including Indonesia. In general, this massive global financial cycle
has amplified the business cycle and one of the option to deal with the so-called
enhanced trillema is focus on the excessive leverage and credit growth as well
as some forms of capital control such as tax on non-core liabilities. Therefore, in
this chapter, we combine the model from the first and second chapters, mainly
the macro prudential policy and non Ricardian households issue, and develop a
New-Keynesian DSGE model for a small open economy, and estimate it for the
Indonesian economy. The parameter estimation process uses Bayesian approach
to explore the role of macro prudential policy and tax in non-core liabilities as
one form of the capital control policy. Therefore, with those policy options, this
research explores the potential role of each policy to mitigate the massive am-
plification of the domestic business cycle and finding an optimal policy choice
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CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 1 : MONETARY ANDMACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
INTERACTION : BALANCE SHEET AND LENDING REGULATION
1.1 Introduction
In the wake of the global financial crisis that hit the US and European economies
in the late 2000s, there is an emerging consensus that macroeconomic mod-
els and policy should be redesigned (CIEPR, 2011). Therefore, policy makers
have set financial stability and price stability as their primary objective. One of
the follow-ups is to formulate and execute macro-prudential policy along with
monetary policy.
While monetary policy with its price stability objective is associated with a
single instrument, macro-prudential policy has many instruments on both the
balance sheet and the lending contract side. Some balance sheet regulations
are capital requirement, reserve requirements, and foreign exchange position
limit. Some lending contract are loan to value (LTV) ratio and debt to income
(DTI). The possible combinations of monetary policy andmacro-prudential pol-
icy have also led to a large and growingmodel-based literature that explores the
stabilizing role of macro-prudential policy in the presence of financial friction.
(Zhang, 2009, Suh, 2011, Quint and Rabbanal 2011) From a Keynesian perspec-
tive, financial friction, nominal and real rigidities, and distortions are central
to business cycle dynamics and associated with allocative inefficiencies. This
is particularly true of emerging markets and in this case, monetary, fiscal and
macro-prudential policy can be used to reduce those inefficiencies (Hammond
et al, 2009) However, the question is whether the effectiveness of those policies
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depends on how strong the frictions and rigidities are. Examples of frictions
and rigidities include asymmetric information, incomplete markets, moral haz-
ards and the borrower’s attitude toward risk. Moreover, a rise of inter-market
borrowing will lead to an increase in risk exposure of individual financial insti-
tution and that risk will be transmitted to the whole financial system (Angelini,
2011)
The next question is the coordination issue between monetary policy and
macro-prudential policy, mostly from the time series dimension of macro pru-
dential policy. The first part of this question is on how macro-prudential pol-
icy affects the existing transmission mechanism such as the credit channel of
monetary policy. The next question is whether macro prudential policy has an
adverse effect on the price stability goal from monetary policy, particularly for
inflation targeting country such as Indonesia.
Accordingly, this research will assess two scenarios: monetary policy alone
without macro-prudential policy and the combination of both monetary and
macro-prudential policy. Assessment criteria for this "tango" are the volatility
of household consumption, output, inflation rate, asset price, household and
business lending, and bank capital. Additionally, to find the optimal policy
combination, we will minimize the loss function from household utility based
on the assumption that the basic goal of every public policy is to optimize social
welfare.
This paper redefines the financial accelerator concept from BGG by having
an integrated financial contract in which banks and borrowers share a systemic
risk. Negative shocks will lead to increasing default risks, thus influencing both
firms and bank balance sheets. This differs from the BGG approach where firms
2
cosntantly repay their bank loans regardless of any shock. Furthermore, unlike
the BGG approach, this paper includes a financial contract between households
and banks. Additionally, bank capital dynamic also gives rise to credit supplies
friction. These sources of friction will interact and reinforce each other, giving
more pro-cyclical force to the economy. This new perspective provides a clearer
picture of emerging market financial systems than the BGG approach.
With this new perspective, we study the interaction between monetary and
macro-prudential policies in stabilizing the business cycle of emerging markets,
particularly Indonesia. The model includes: (i)a closed economy, (ii) two sec-
tors (consumption goods which are non-durable and housing goods that are
durable), and (iii) two types of agents (saving household and borrowing house-
hold) such that there is a credit market.
The model includes a financial accelerator concept on the borrowing house-
hold and business/entrepreneur side, such that the volatility of housing and
capital prices affects the value of borrowing collateral on both agents and leads
to the possibility of default. In the case of default, collateral is accrued and
adding up to bank equity capital. As such, it functions as a buffer to absorb the
unexpected shocks from aggregate variables. Furthermore, both monetary and
macro prudential policy follow a set of rules, including a standard Taylor rule,
a capital requirement rule and an LTV ratio rule. Both types of policy share a
common loss function from household utility representing the emerging mar-
ket social welfare. The model is parameterized and calibrated using Indonesian
data.
To give a broader context, Asian countries are considered as an early run-
ner of macro-prudential regulations, thus measures on managing credit cycles
3
are not a new phenomenon. The 1997 crisis was the starting point when most
authorities in Asia collectively begun enforcing macro- and micro prudential
regulations as a supplement to their existing monetary policy. One example is
a loan and credit management on the property market. The objective of these
macro-prudential measures has also been to prevent other systemic risks such
as a credit crunch, following the 1997 crisis. In practice, however, most of those
policy measures are performed by discretion and yet have become a built-in
stabilizer (Borio, 2007)
In Indonesia, the instrument that is often used is capital adequacy require-
ment where Bank Indonesia (hereafter BI) changes the risk weighting of bank
asset classes to respond to the post-crisis credit crunch1
Another macro-prudential regulation is the adjustments of Reserve Require-
ments associated with LDR, meaning the higher LDR leads to relatively lower
reserves. Similar with changes in risk weights, adjustments of Reserve Require-
ments is to encourage lending to the private sector (Utari et al, 2012)
Although those measures are already in practice, there are still several is-
sues about macro prudential policy in need of further research. The first issue
is the level of pro-cyclicality of the financial system. Compared to its Asian fel-
low, pro-cyclicality in Indonesian financial market is relatively higher owing to
the fact that bank is still the main source of financing, thus disruption to the
supply of bank credit is transmitted to the private sectors. Moreover, since the
role of foreign bank branch offices in the domestic economy are increasingly
significant, any changes in country risk assessment from their head office is di-
1For example, in 2006, BI relaxed several regulations for banks to encourage lending after oil
price crisis in 2005 such as the reduction of asset risk weight for small business credit to 85%,
mortgages down to 40%, and credit to employee/retiree to 50%.
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rectly translated into branch offices pro-cyclical behavior. A Second issue is the
institutional change where Indonesian government separated the banking su-
pervision function from BI into financial supervisory authority (hereafter OJK).
Therefore, micro prudential and macro prudential policy will be disentangled
from the central bank, leaving the monetary policy as a single tool as of 2014.
Therefore this model also incorporates the high pro-cyclicality of Indone-
sian financial system and imposing a joint loss function for both policy from
both institutions, representing the importance of strong coordination between
monetary policy and macro prudential regulation.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Household
There are two types of households: Saving households (thus denoted by sub-
script s) which are more patient about their future consumption forward-looking
and have access to capital markets. Their budget constraint is:
Ct;s + P
H
t I
H;s
t +
Bt
Pt
+Dt + et + Tt;s (1.1)
 RNt 1
Bt 1
Pt
+RDt 1Dt 1 +R
e
t 1et 1 + wtN
s
t +Div
f
t +Div
e
t
Saving households receive wage income, income from risk-free assets, real
return on deposits and bank capital, and dividends from bankers and entrepre-
neurs. They spend their income on consumption Cst , investment in housing,
IH;st , holdings of risk-free assets, real bank deposits, real bank equity capital and
lump-sum tax.
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Both Saving and Borrowing Households maximize the present value (j =
s; b)of expected utility which is derived from non-durable goods consumption
Ct;j , Housing goods consumption Ht;j and leisures (= 1   Nt;j), Borrowing
households have lower discount factor (tb < 
t
s) than saving household, repre-
senting borrowing household less patient behavior about their future consump-
tion. Difference in time preference parameter is inspired by the seminal paper
by Iaocaviello (2005) that models the financial friction between these types of
household. Thus, saving household always save and borrowing household al-
ways borrow around the steady state due to this time parameter distinction.
Other strong assumption is that agents stay in each group forever :
maxE0
1X
t=0
tj flogCt;j + (1  t )logHt;j + 'log(1 Nt;jg (1.2)
subject to the above budget constraint
Borrowing households is assumed to use housing goods as collateral against
their borrowing, while default will occur when the value of the collateral drop
below the debt obligation that is set upon borrowing agreement. Thus the fore-
closure risk is represented by the integral part
R $H;bt 1
0
!PHt H
b
t f(!)d!; an amount
that borrowing household have to surrender to bank equity capital. The remain-
ing part is fraction of borrowing household that survive from default and pay
all their debt from previous period.
Cbt + P
H
t [I
H;b
t +
R $H;bt 1
0
!PHt H
b
t f(!)d!] + [1  F ($H;bt 1)]RLHt 1LLHt 1 + T bt  wtN bt +LHt
(1.3)
The lump sum taxes paid by Borrowing households, T bt , are the same as
those paid by Saving households.
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1.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods using constant returns to scale tech-
nology. They use capital and labor from households, entrepreneurs and bankers
as follows :
Yt = AtK
k
t 1N
n
t N
ne
t;e N
nf
t;f (1.4)
where k + n +ne +nf = 1. The main reason to put the labor from entre-
preneurs and bankers into production function is to ensure that entrepreneur
net worth and bank equity capital will be non-zero around steady state. An-
other reason is to mimic an emerging market structure, that enterpreneurs and
bankers contribution to the economy, in terms of aggregate output, are still very
small.
Thus the marginal product of capital Kt is
zt = mct:

Yt
Kt 1

(1.5)
followed by marginal product of labor from household, entrepreneurs and
bankers respectively
wt = mct:n

Yt
Nt

(1.6)
wt;e = mct:

Yt
Nt;e

(1.7)
wt;f = mct:

Yt
Nt;f

(1.8)
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Here, for simplification, labor supply for both the entrepreneurs and the
bankers will be fixed at 1
The balance sheet structure for entrepreneur will be
Wt = Vt + wt;e (1.9)
where entrepreneur net worthWt is equal to retained earnings Vt with real
wage from entrepreneurs wt;e. The fraction (1  )Vt is the dividend that goes to
saving household every period.
The entrepreneur earning Vt is the project return net of the borrowing expen-
ditures
Vt =
R1
$H;bt 1
!RKt qt 1Kt 1f(!)d!   (1  F ($H;bt 1))RLBt 1LLBt 1 (1.10)
where ! is a unit mean, idiosyncratic shock experienced by the individual
entrepreneur after project has started where
R1
0
!dF (!) = 1 and $b is the de-
fault threshold.
R1
$H;bt 1
!RKt qt 1Kt 1f(!)d! denotes the payoff for entrepreneur
in case of the value of the project is at least as big as the borrowing amount as
collateral. However in the case of default when there is a negative shock that
(! < $b), the project will be accrued by the bank and add up to the bank equity
capital. Finally the (1   F ($H;bt 1))RLBt 1LLBt 1 part denotes the "default survival"
debt repayment that matures on each period.
8
1.2.3 Capital Producer
At the beginning of each period, the capital producer purchases It amounts of
consumption goods at a price of one and turns them into the same amount of
new capital. Transformation costs arise during the process and at the end of the
period they resell new
capital to entrepreneurs at price qt. The law of motion for capital stock is
given by
Kt = It + (1  )Kt 1 (1.11)
The capital producer optimization is defined by
max
I
(qt   1)It   f( It
Kt 1
)Kt 1
where f(:::) is a simple quadratic form of
f(
It
Kt 1
) =
k
2
(
It
Kt 1
  )2Kt 1
and the first order condition resulted in capital price
qt = 1 + f
0(
It
Kt 1
) (1.12)
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1.2.4 Aggregation
Aggregate variable can be derived by summing up saving and borrowing
household such as
IHt = I
H
t;s + I
H
t;b (1.13)
NHt (S) = N
H
t;s +N
H
t;b (1.14)
where NHt (S) = NHt (D)
1.2.5 Financial Contract
In the literature about financial friction that developed way long before the cur-
rent financial crisis are the seminal paper by Bernanke in 1999, where financial
frictions between household and firm through bank have been incorporated
into a general equilibrium framework. In this approach, frictions come from
the fact that loan monitoring is costly that drives an external finance premium
concept between the lending and the risk free rate. The recent version of this
BGG approach was Kannan et al, 2009 assessing macroprudential policy im-
pact to advanced economy. Second mainstream was introduced by Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997(henceforth KM), extended by Iocaviello, 2005 and the recent
study by Angelini, 2011 where financial frictions is modeled through collateral
constraint.
The contracts in this model were inspired by Suh, 2011 and Zhang, 2009
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which used the refined BGG mechanism. While the line of KM does not model
default probability of the borrower, Suh and Zang have modeled the default
probability through an idiosyncratic shock and compare it to the default thresh-
old level. Secondly, there exist bank equity capital that function as capital buffer
that absorbs the unexpected shocks in aggregate variables. With the ex-ante and
ex-post default threshold, there will be a forecast discrepancies for either cap-
ital or housing price resulted from those aggregate shocks. That forecast error
is translated into gain or loss on bank capital, thus functioning bank capital as
the buffer stock. Differs from Suh, this model tried to compensate the markup
regulation from macroprudential rule violation to bank capital as well as on the
funding rate. Therefore the mechanism is differs from pure BGG approach.
Entrepreneur Business Loan
We begin with entrepreneur loan contract. At the beginning of each period t ,the
loan demand for individual entrepreneur i is determined by the gap between his
investment project and his endowment in terms of net worth
LB;it = qtK
i
t  W it (1.15)
where $i;at is the ex-ante threshold idiosyncratic level that determines de-
fault probability of an entrepreneur.
Then the gross repayment amount will be equal to expected project return
such as
11
RLBt L
LB
t = $
i;a
t EtR
K
t+1qtKt (1.16)
therefore the entrepreneur will maximize his expected return net with debt
payback
E(Vt+1) =
R1
$i;at
!EtR
K
t+1qtKtf(!)d!   (1  F ($i;at ))RLBt LLBt (1.17)
subject to contract constraint where entrepreneur should provide the same ex-
pected return to the bank as its funding cost for the project
Rft (qtK
i
t  W it ) = (1 F ($i;at ))RLBt LLBt +(1 )
R $i;at
0
!EtR
K
t+1qtKtf(!)d! (1.18)
 is the monitoring cost from BGG approach that represents "costly state
verification". This problem arises between the entrepreneur and bank and bank
will incur this cost in the case of default.
From the above optimization problem we can derive the external finance
premium concept that resembles the BGG financial accelerator mechanism as
follows :
EtR
K
t+1
Rft
= S(
qtKt
Wt
) (1.19)
where S is increasing in ( qtKt
Wt
), thus implying that the external finance pre-
mium term EtR
K
t+1
Rft
is also increasing in the net-worth ratio leverage ratio, rep-
resenting financial accelerator mechanism in the model. For example, when a
positive shock improves the net-worth of entrepreneur, his improving balance
sheet condition enables him to further increase his investment with lower pre-
mium.
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From 1.16 the return from business loan RLBt is
$i;at EtR
K
t+1qtKt
LLBt
and since for
period t+1, ex-post productivity threshold $bt will be
$bt =
RLBt L
LB
t
RKt+1qtKt
=
$atEtR
K
t+1
RKt+1
(1.20)
Household Loan
Household loan contract use the similar refined BGG mechanism as of entre-
preneur loan contract. With an an idiosyncratic housing price shock !H;i that
hits an individual borrowing household i every period. Default will happen if
the value of housing as collateral is less than the household loan contract, when
the idiosyncratic shock is less than a cutoff level $H;i
The household loan contract can be defined as :
RLHt L
H;i
t = $
H;i;aEtPt
H
t+1H
i
t+1;b (1.21)
where the expectation term EtPtHt+1H it+1;b is the is the expected value of the
housing collateral from the borrowing household. Thus, similar with entrepre-
neur, bank will set the value of the loan contract equal to the expected return
from borrowing household, which is
(1  F ($H;i;at ))RLHt LLHt + (1  H)
R $H;bt 1
0
!EtP
H
t+1H
i
t+1;bf(!)d! (1.22)
= (Rft + v +Q(ltvt   ltvt))LH;it
We assume that RLHt and $
H;a
t are set to satisfy 1.21 and 1.22, given L
H;i
t and
EtP
H
t+1H
i
t+1;b.
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Noting that there are a markup v in household loan contract which assumed
the the proceed from this markup goes into saving household as dividend in-
come, and the regulatory markup Q(ltv) that capture loan to value ratio viola-
tion above the LTV rule. In this case, borrowing household has to pay an addi-
tional regulatory penalty in terms of higher interest payment, for taking higher
LTV ratio above the target LTV set by macroprudential regulator.
1.2.6 Bank
There is a bank as a homogeneous intermediary agent with a standard balance
sheet : In the liability side consists of two channels of financing: deposits and
equity capital. Its asset side consists of business and household lending. One of
the feature here that is bank funding rate decision
 
Rf

charged to household
and entrepreneur is determined by adding a regulatory markup to the actual
funding rate, which is a weighted average of the deposit rate
 
RD

and the re-
turn on bank capital (Re)2. The additional term of regulatory markup try to
capture the restriction imposed on the banking sector by the regulatory author-
ity, as a function of the difference between the required capital ratio and the
actual capital ratio
Rft = tR
e
t + (1  t)RDt + s(t   t) (1.23)
where the actual capital ratio t = etLt is the weight factor between the deposit
rate
 
RD

and the return on bank capital (Re) and the bank funding rate
 
Rf

is
2this structure captures bank interest rate rigidities phenomenon in Indonesia. On the
counter deposit rate is relatively flexible following the benchmark risk free rate (Bank Indonesia
Certificate) but the funding rate is relatively rigid.
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an increasing function of regulation markup s(t   t). Violation over capital
ratio regulation will be translated into the higher bank funding rate that reflect
banks managerial decision upon the regulator corrective measure
Bank capital, et, where et = Lt   Dt, owned by saving households, and
functions as a buffer stock to absorb the discrepancies between expected returns
and actual returns from both borrowing household and business lending. It gets
accumulated when the actual return from the capital price or the housing price
is not lower than the expected return upon which the loan contract for either
entrepreneur or borrowing household is written, and deaccumulated vice versa.
Also, it is assumed that fraction of bank capital is paid off to saving households
as dividends. This is similar to a transversality condition that prevents bank
capital from being over accumulated as well as representing wealthy saving
household (income polarity in the emerging market). The law of motion for the
bank capital is given as follow :
et = (1  )et 1 (1.24)
+(1  F ($H;i;at ))RLHt 1LLHt 1 + (1  )
R $H;i;at
0
!PHt H
i
t 1;bf(!)d!
+(1  F ($H;i;at ))RLBt 1LBt 1 + (1  )
R $H;i;at
0
!RKt qt 1Kt 1f(!)d!
 Rft 1(LLBt 1 + LLHt 1) + wt;;f + et
with et as the exogenous shock in bank equity capital. The above equation
can be rewritten by collecting the c.d.f and loan type as follows :
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et = (1  )et 1 + wt;;f
+((F ($H;at 1)  F ($H;bt 1))RLHt 1LLHt 1 + (1  )
R $H;bt 1
$H;at 1
!PHt H
i
t 1;bf(!)d!
+((F ($at 1)  F ($bt 1))RLBt 1LBt 1 + (1  )
R $bt 1
$at 1
!RKt qt 1Kt 1f(!)d!
+et
so that the forecast discrepancies of the collateral value for both entrepreneur
and borrowing household can accumulate or deaccumulate bank equity capital.
For example when the realized value or ex-post value ofRKt or PHt is lower than
its expected value or ex-ante value, we will have ($b > $a) for entrepreneur
or ($H;b > $H;a) for saving household, consequently ((F ($a)   F ($b) < 0) or
((F ($H;a)  F ($H;b) < 0) respectively, thus bank equity capital will be deaccu-
mulate, vice versa.
1.2.7 Retailers
Following Calvo (1983), differentiated retailer firms set prices in a staggered
fashion. Each firm resets prices with probability (1-) each period, while a frac-
tion  index prices to last period’s inflation. Firms that do not optimize at time t
index prices to a geometric average  p;t of last period’s inflation and the inflation
target:
 p;t =  p;t 1 (1 + t 1)
H (1 + )1 H
where H is the share of nonoptimising firms that index to past inflation. A
firm resetting its price in period t optimizes the present value of expected profits
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subject to the dynamics of aggregate inflation and demand from final goods
producers
maxEt
1X
k=0
kpt+k

Yt+kP

i;t  MCt+kYt+k

P i;t represents the price chosen by a firms that repotimises at time t. The first
order condition for optimal price setting in period t is:
Et
 1X
k=0
kpt+kYi;t+kP

i;t p;t+k   (1 + p;t+k)MCt+k
!
= 0
This setup leads to the following inflation dynamics:
Et+1 = t   (1  )1  

mct + 

t (1.25)
where mct is the log deviation of real marginal cost from steady state, and t is
an iid cost push shock.
In steady state the price is set as a markup over marginal cost. In the limit
where all firms reoptimise ( = 0), the price is set equal to marginal cost.
1.2.8 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor-type rule that is sensitive to in-
flation above target and to the log deviation of output from steady state, yt:
RNt = rR
N
t 1 + (1  r)
h
'^t + 'y bYti+ Rt (1.26)
1.2.9 Macroprudential Regulation
The regulatory authority, either central bank or separate financial supervisory
body sets the target capital requirement ratio t and target Loan to-Value ra-
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tio ltvt, according to rules that systemically react to observable macro variables
such as output, credit, or housing prices.
Capital Requirement Regulation
The functional form of regulatory markup for capital requirement is
s(t   t) = a((exp[b (t   t)=])  1) (1.27)
t = t 1 + '

Y
bYt + 'LbLt (1.28)
Loan-to-Value Regulation
Q(ltvt   ltvt) = Ha ((exp[Hb (ltvt   ltvt)=ltv])  1) (1.29)
ltvt = ltvltvt 1;r   'ltvPH cPHt (1.30)
where a is the level of intervention and b is the level of responsiveness of
macroprudential regulation3
The target capital requirement ratio and target LTV ratio function are lin-
ear in log-linearized terms, similar to Taylor-rule type monetary policy, and are
3An exponential function allows regulator to impose heavier penalty based on the deviation
from the rule and minus one is intended to avoid penalty in the intercept region when the
deviation from the rule is zero.
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allowed to have some degree of policy inertia since in practice, capital require-
ment and LTV target are relatively rigid.
The concept of dynamic capital requirement is adopted from the counter-
cyclical capital buffer concept in Basel III that bank should conserve capital in
good times that can be used in bad times. Since the common reference point
for taking buffer decision is the behavior of the credit to GDP, credit and GDP
variable enter the equation rule in log linear form, meaning bank is required to
accumulate more capital during credit boom or good economic cycle, vice versa.
1.2.10 Fiscal Policy
Fiscal Policy is simply clears the market by balancing government expenditure
Gt which is financed by lump-sum taxes from both households Tt;s and Tt;b, as
well as risk-free assets issuance Bt purchased by saving household
Gt = Tt;s + Tt;b +Bt (1.31)
1.2.11 Aggregate Equilibrium
Market clearing conditions for final goods is written as
Yt=st = Ct;b + Ct;s + qtIt + P
H
t I
H
t +Gt (1.32)
+
R $bt 1
0
!RKt qt 1Kt 1dF (!)
+
R $H;bt 1
0
!PHt H
i
t;bdF (!) + & t
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Note that the last two terms on the right-hand-side of the equation corre-
spond to monitoring cost and regulatory penalty where & t denotes the terms
representing the resource usage by regulatory penalties.
1.3 Parameter Calibration
Several parameter value are chosen from several new Keynesian literatures in
Indonesia such as monetary-fiscal interaction as in Hermawan, Munro (2008),
and financial friction as in Tjahjono (2010) and Harmanta, et al (2012), including
the quarterly discount factor, frisch-labor supply elasticity, capital share, depre-
ciation rate, and steady state share of consumption and investment expenditure
from total output.
In the production sector, the share of capital, labor, entrepreneur labor, and
banker labor in the Cobb-Douglas production function is chosen to be 0.30, 0.68,
0.01, and 0.01, respectively, in line with the fact that the Labor intensive industry
still dominates Indonesian economy, particularly low-income labor.
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Table 1.1: Calibrated Parameter
value Description value Description
 0.99 Discount factor, savers c 0.0071 Markup in household lending
b 0.98 Discount factor, borrowers A 0.85 Autocorrelation, productivity
 0.9 Weight of housing in the utility  0.95 Autocorrelation, housing demand
' 2 Weight of labor in the utility G 0.8 Autocorrelation, fiscal policy
k 0.30 Weight, capital in the production r 0.85 Autocorrelation, monetary policy
n 0.68 Weight, households’ labor in the production  0.9 Autocorrelation, Capital Requirement
e 0.01 Weight, entrepreneurs’ labor in the production ltv 0.9 Autocorrelation, target LTV ratio
f 0.01 Weight, bankers’ labor in the production  1.5 Monetary policy response to inflation
 0.025 Capital Depreciation y 0.1 Monetary policy response to output gap
 0.973 Entrepreneur profit retention rate SEG 0.004 SE, government spending shock
 0.44 SD, idiosyncratic shock, business SEr 0.0003 SE, monetary shock
H 0.13 SD, idiosyncratic shock, housing price SEe 0.0045 SE, bank capital shock
 0.035 Bank dividend rate SEa 0.0063 SE, productivity shock
 k 4 Capital adjustment cost SE 0.0011 SE, housing demand shock
IH
Y
0.03 Housing investment / output Ia 0.0025 Degree of regulatory intervention, CRR
G
Y
0.17 Government spending / output Ib 25 Degree of regulatory sensitivity, CRR
 0.09 Default cost, business Ha 0.0025 Degree of regulatory intervention, LTV
H 0.15 Default cost, household Ha 25 Degree of regulatory sensitivity, LTV
Table 1.2: Steady State Ratio
Variable Steady state ratios Calibrated Value
C
Y Consumption output ratio 0.64
I
Y Investment output ratio 0.20
IH
Y Housing investment output ratio 0.03
G
Y Government expenditure output ratio 0.13
LB
LH
Business - consumer lending ratio 3.5
LH
Y Consumer lending output ratio 0.25
R Deposit rate 4
1.4 Second Moment Comparison and Model Fit
In the model fit part, we present the standard deviation of some of the key vari-
ables from data., as well as their counterpart from the calibrated model. In the
table 4, the first row represents the data and the second row is the unconditional
moments from the calibrated model, both in percentage terms. Particularly for
credit data, loan for entrepreneurs is represented by the total of working cap-
ital and investment credit, while the housing loan is represented by consumer
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loan.The model does reasonably well in capturing macro variables such as con-
sumption and real GDP. However, model volatility outperform the volatility of
prices and quantities, such as inflation and credit, despite the assumption of dif-
ferent degree of nominal rigidities, indexation and different standard deviation
of shocks. Apparently, structural changes following the Asian crisis has lead to
the less pronounced business cycle for the later time period. On the other hand,
high persistence of CPI inflation and the procyclicality of financial market in
Indonesia are still relatively hard to fit.
Table 1.3: Second Moment Comparison
 logC 0:96
model (1:16)
 log Y 1:67
model (1:95)
 log  0:24
model (0:30)
 logLb 11:81
model (8:39)
 logLh 2:19
model (1:89)
1.5 Impulse Response Functions
Impulse Response functions (hereafter IRF), shown in Appendix A, evaluate
the effects of macroprudential policy on several domestic economy variables
such as Consumption, Investment, GDP, Policy rate, Housing price, Consumer
loan, Business loan, Inflation rate, and Bank capital. First comparison scenario
is between baseline policy with only monetary policy against capital regulation
policy which is a tango policy of monetary policy and capital regulation policy.
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Next scenario is policy comparison between monetary policy and loan to value
ratio.
A one standard deviation productivity shock from baseline scenario implies
a rise in consumption, investment and GDP as well as decline on inflation rate.
Consumption increase leads to housing demand increase thus housing price
also rise due to exogenous housing supply. From financial system, central bank
respond low inflation with declining policy rate which further reduces the cost
of fund. Therefore both both business and consumer lending increase. On
the contrary, from monetary policy and macroprudential capital regulation sce-
nario, capital requirement respond to increase in both business and consumer
credit. Accordingly credit expansion stabilize more quickly than in baseline sce-
nario, thus higher bank capital is also required as a "buffer in the good time" sce-
nario. Consequently, consumption, investment and GDP is still increase but rel-
atively stable than baseline scenario. The tango between monetary and macro-
prudential policy resulted in lower policy rate, meaningmacroprudential policy
helps easing the burden on monetary policy to stabilize the business cycle.
A one standard deviation on bank capital shock implies a direct shock to
financial system such as an increasing amount of non-performing loans. This
shock leads to a loss on bank capital. With more restricted equity capital, banks
tend to shrink their loan to business and households. The credit crunch will fur-
ther deteriorate the economy, particularly consumption and investment, GDP
and inflation. As a result, central bank help the economic recovery by sharply
lowers interest rate. On the other hand, when monetary policy interact with
countercyclical capital requirement scenario, banks are allowed to accumulate
less capital. Therefore, decline in both business and consumer lending are more
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moderate and the impact to the recessionary pressure to macro variables is rela-
tively less severe. This result confirms the strong procyclicality of financial sys-
tem in Indonesia where bank is is the major financing source for private sector
and financial shock will have big impact to the business cycle.
A one standard deviation productivity shock frommonetary and macropru-
dential loan to value regulation scenario implies similar countercyclical power
to the economy as of capital requirement scenario. In this case, dynamic LTV
rule is successful in stabilizing housing price upon a productivity shock with
two quarters lag. Stronger regulation from dynamic LTV rule dampens house-
hold lending expansion and the rise in housing price. It is noticeable that there
is regulatory arbitrage - a substitution of credit from the regulated consumer
lending to the less regulated business lending. As a result, business lending is
higher than in the baseline model. In this case, a segmented regulation to some
extent can amplify the volatility of other markets by regulatory arbitrage behav-
ior. Two suspected forces drive this arbitrage behavior. First, the cost of fund
for business lending becomes relatively cheaper than consumer lending. Sec-
ondly, bank capital is higher with LTV rule, which leads to more loanable fund
for bank to facilitate more lending.
An exogenous housing demand shock is interpreted as a decline in the hous-
ing price or durable goods. The housing price drop leads to lower LTV rule,
dampening the negative impact from household default. The fall of housing
prices is mainly absorbed by lower bank capital from default events. Another
result of lower LTV is the increasing consumer loan but since the appetite for
new housing investment falls, demand for business loan also decreasing , sig-
naling another regulatory arbitrage.
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1.6 Policy Impacts on Business Cycle Stabilization
The following section identifies the stabilization effect from the baseline sce-
nario, comparing with the policy mix scenario (appendix B). The first compar-
ison is between monetary policy alone and a combination between monetary
policy and the countercyclical capital requirement. The numbers in the first ta-
ble are standard deviation decompositions of consumption, output , inflation,
housing price, business lending, household lending and bank capital. It is ob-
served that the policy mix reduces the volatility of consumption, investment,
GDP, housing prices, particularly business and consumer lending. The impor-
tant finding is the relatively neutral impact of this policy mix to inflation rate.
Therefore, this type of policy mix is considered to be the optimal policy for busi-
ness cycle stabilization.
The second comparison is betweenmonetary policy alone and the policymix
between monetary policy and an LTV rule, as presented in the second table. In
terms of the achieving its objective, an LTV rule is able to stabilize housing price
and credit to consumer. However, the regulatory arbitrage behavior occurs and
creating more volatile credit to business. This volatiliy leads to more swing on
business cycle, notably investment, GDP and inflation rate. This result strongly
suggests that policymakers need to be aware of the possibility of regulatory ar-
bitrage when implementing a segmented regulatory measure. Moreover, there
is a possibilty of conflict with monetary policy objective in terms of managing
inflation.
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1.7 Optimal Policy Mix
The next question is about the optimal policy mix between monetary policy and
macro prudential policy. The criteria to achieve the optimal combination of pol-
icy parameters are by maximizing a welfare gains. For the welfare measure, we
use the average households’ utility between the saver and borrower household
to equally capture welfare from all households
To find the optimal parameter value, we adopt grid search method and we
restrict the parameter value bounded to an empirically consistent range such
as Taylor principle for Taylor rule. Therefore, the range for monetary policy
parameters is between 1.2 to 3 and 0 to 1 for inflation gap and output gap pa-
rameter respectively. Particularly for macro prudential policy parameters, their
values are bounded between 0-2 ranges. The grid size is 0.2 and there are three
scenarios and three regimes.
In the Baseline scenario, only monetary policy performs using the calibrated
parameters that is 1.5 and 1 respectively and nomacro prudential instruments in
this scenario. The Optimal scenario is similar with the previous scenario where
only monetary policy performs but using the optimal parameters from grid
search. Lastly, the Optimal Mix scenario is the optimal monetary and macro-
prudential policy parameters combination with grid search.
In the Stable regime, business cycle is characterized only by productivity
shock without any disruption from financial market or asset price, followed by
Normal regime where business cycle are characterized by productivity shock,
decrease in bank capital and drop in housing demand. The magnitude in those
two regimes follows the calibrated baseline model. In the Volatile scenario, the
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magnitude of shocks from normal scenario are doubled, meaning more volatile
productivity, banking and housing shocks
The result in table 2, Appendix C suggests the optimal policy combinations
and welfare gains for each regime. For the stable scenario where only the pro-
ductivity shock drives the business cycle, optimal scenario where monetary pol-
icy follows a strong Taylor principle (3 for inflation gap and 0.2 for output gap)
is the optimal policy with 0.088% relative welfare gain. However, for normal
scenario when bank capital and housing demand shocks jointly add the pro-
cyclicality of the business cycle, then the policy mix between hawkish monetary
policy and macro prudential policy is the optimal policy with welfare gain of
0.678%. Finally, for volatile scenario where all shocks from previous scenario
are doubled meaning stronger pro-cyclicality of business cycles, more aggres-
sive policy mix is the optimal policy, although the welfare gain is slightly lower
than normal scenario. From this assessment, monetary policy will perform op-
timally under cycle from inflationary shock but when financial and asset shocks
exist, policy mix with macro prudential policy is the optimal policy.
1.8 Conclusion
Based on a simple calibrated DSGE model, we can model unique feature of In-
donesia as the prototype of emerging market model. Financial friction do plays
an important role since banking activities still dominate the Indonesian econ-
omy, mainly through middle-class household financing followed by corpora-
tions financing, although the share of the latter is smaller empirically. We also
introduced rule based countercyclical macro prudential policy that does func-
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tion as an additional automatic stabilizer for Indonesian economy, together with
monetary policy. The first macro prudential policy instrument is the counter-
cyclical capital requirement ala Basel III, which directly influencing both house-
holds and corporate financing, can lower credit and output volatility, and rel-
atively effective against bank capital shocks but relatively neutral to inflation.
Other countercyclical instrument is LTV ratio, however, with massive bank liq-
uidity; bank can do regulatory arbitrage by financing other unregulated credit
market. In this model, under strict LTV scenario, bank financing goes to fi-
nance corporate credit. Empirically, although the growth of corporate financing
is lower than the one of households but the level or themagnitude is higher thus
casts regulators another important challenge. Another important feature in this
model is the exponential penalty function to any violation from the macro pru-
dential rule. It implies that general enforcement of macro prudential rule is
preferable than case by case or discretion. In addition, it is important to have a
common loss function to ensure the optimal interaction between monetary and
macro prudential policy. Policy recommendation from this research is to assign
monetary policy solely to inflation stabilization and macro prudential policy
solely to credit and asset price stabilization. However, with extra volatility or
countercyclical power, aggressive monetary and macro prudential policy and
the asset side tend to decrease welfare gain. Therefore, in the third chapter, we
will model an open economy with global banking glut and flight to quantity to
assess the possibility of additional policy instrument
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CHAPTER 2
CHAPTER 2 : MONETARY POLICY AND FISCAL ROLE UNDER THE
EXISTENCE OF NON RICARDIAN HOUSEHOLD
2.1 Introduction
The financial crisis that hit the U.S. and European economies in the late 2000s
changed the overall perspectives on the importance of monetary policy and fis-
cal policy interaction on coping with the impact of sluggish world economy on
a domestic economy. The role of monetary policy in macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion is well accepted. However, the role of fiscal policy is less well understood.
In a Neoclassical world there is little scope for stabilising fiscal policy; while in
a Keynesian world fiscal policy may play a substantial role.
From a Neoclassical perspective, business cycles are seen as optimal re-
sponses to shocks, to a first approximation, and rigidities and distortions are
not central issues. If there were inefficiencies that created a role for fiscal pol-
icy, fiscal policy would still be largely impotent since infinitely lived Ricardian
households would smooth their consumption through the effects of a rise in
government spending by saving and borrowing1. If anything, a rise in gov-
1In a standard New-Keynesian model, the assumption of all households are forward looking
and able to smooth consumption by exchanging physical or financial assets, called Ricardian
type of household. That household behavior has amplify the negative wealth effect. As a re-
sult, household consumption becomes a function of permanent rather than current disposable
income. Therefore "Ricardian equivalence" holds and fiscal policy becomes ineffective.
However, there is growing skepticism that the whole Ricardian assumption represents a
good approximation to reality, mostly in the emerging economy. Empirically, consumption
seems to track current income more closely than predicted by standard representative-agent
and overlapping-generations models ( e.g., Hall, 1978, and Campbell and Mankiw, 1989). In
the light of this research, we follow the work of Mankiw (Mankiw, 2000) that emphasized the
need to build a new type of model for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic
stabilization. Such type of model should allow for heterogeneity of a particular form: some
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ernment spending would have a small wealth effect, leading to a small fall in
consumption.
From a Keynesian perspective, rigidities and distortions are central to busi-
ness cycle dynamics and business cycles are associated with allocative ineffi-
ciencies. In such a world fiscal policy can be used to reduce such inefficiencies.
The effectiveness of fiscal policy, however, depends on the existence of distor-
tions and rigidities such as limited access to credit that leads to non Ricardian or
poor household behaviour (e.g., consumption out of current income rather than
lifetime income, as in the IS-LM model). In the presence of such rigidities, a
rise in government spending would lead to an increase in income and therefore
consumption.
The empirical evidence, based on Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model,
tends to support the Keynesian perspective: a rise in government spending is
associated with a rise in consumption in some studies, and a small and insignif-
icant effect in others, but rarely with a fall in consumption (Gali and Monacelli,
2005).
From a practical perspective most economists support the use of automatic
fiscal stabilisers, suggesting a role for fiscal policy. Gali (2005) presents evidence
that fiscal policy in OECD countries has becomemore countercyclical over time,
which he interprets as evidence of an active role for fiscal policy. There has been
renewed interest in fiscal policy in the Euro area due to the limits of monetary
policy at the country level. There has also been renewed interest in inflation
targeting countries have found that low and stable inflation outcomes can be
households should act in an optimizing, fully forward-looking manner, while others ought to
follow a simple rule of thumb that renders consumption smoothing impossible or so calledNon-
Ricardian households. Mankiw argues that such form of heterogeneity can be easily reconciled
with stylized facts at both the micro and macro level (Coenen-Straub, 2005)
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accompanied by substantial internal imbalances on the UK (Leith and Wren-
Lewis, 1999) or external imbalances for the case of New Zealand (Buckle and
Drew, 2006). Such imbalances suggest that monetary policy alone may not ef-
fectively stabilise the economy and a potential role for fiscal policy. In this paper
we explore the potential role for fiscal policy in an emerging economy. Fiscal
policy may be important for stabilisation in emerging economies, if less devel-
oped markets are associated with allocative inefficiency, or if a lack of access
to credit by poor households or undeveloped retail credit markets mean more
widespread nonRicardian consumption behaviour.
While monetary policy is generally associated with a few instruments, fiscal
policy has more potential instruments on both the expenditure side and rev-
enue side, which will have different effects. For example, a temporary increase
in VAT ismore likely to affect private consumption decisions as it directly affects
prices (Wren-Lewis, 2002). Moreover there is a broad set of rigidities and dis-
tortions that create a potential role for fiscal policy. The possible combinations
of rigidities and fiscal instruments has led to a large and growing model-based
literature that explores the stabilising role of fiscal policies in the presence of
sticky prices, sticky wages, tax distortions, non-Ricardian consumption behav-
iour (Gali, et al 2007), monetary union (Gali and Monacelli 2004, Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe 2004, Benigno and Woodford 2003), the valuation of nominal gov-
ernment liabilities (Leeper and Yun, 2005), and economic openness (Gali and
Monacelli, 2004).
Fiscal-monetary interaction may be especially relevant where the net fiscal
position is large, so that monetary policy has a larger effect on fiscal debt service
costs, or where the fiscal position has a large currency mismatch2 so that mon-
2Even if the net fiscal position is zero, in a country with a significant domestic currency debt
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etary policy effects on the exchange rate affect fiscal flows. If monetary policy
has a large effect on fiscal flows, monetary policy may be undermined through
political pressure to avoid undesirable effects on the fiscal position. Similarly,
where reserves holdings are large and the carry cost and valuation effects fall
on the central bank’s balance sheet, monetary policy may be undermined by a
desire to protect the integrity of the monetary authority’s balance sheet.
This paper extends the analysis of fiscal monetary interaction in Coenen and
Straub (2005) to a small open economy setting and to an emerging economy en-
vironment to find the optimal policy mix between monetary and fiscal policy
in Indoneisa. There are three scenarios; first is the baseline scenario, followed
by the assumption of "all Ricardians" and the third is "mixed" policy, where we
assign the policy parameters from the all Ricardians scenario to the baseline
economy, representing the impact of misguided policy to an economy. In gen-
eral setting the small open economy features are important for macroeconomic
stabilisation because of the shock absorber roles of the exchange rate and the
currency account and the importance of foreign shocks to the domestic econ-
omy. Open economy features may also be important in assessing the effect of
monetary policy on fiscal flows via exchange rate fluctuations and the wedge
between domestic and foreign interest rates, a channel has become increasingly
relevant in Asia as reserves positions have increased. The small open economy
DSGE model features both Ricardian and non Ricardian agents, sticky prices
and offsettig foreign currency reserves holdings, the carry cost of the interest rate mismatch and
the effect of exchange rate fluctations on both the net position and interest receipts may still be
relevant. Sterilised intervention in the foreign exchange market, where accumulation of foreign
currency reserves is sterilised by equivalent issuance of domestic curreny government debt,
will create a mismatched position. In practice, sterilisation need not be complete in the pres-
ence of financial deepening or productivity growth that puts downward pressure on inflation.
Moreover, sterilisation may be achieved through an interest rate instrument or other monetary
instruments such as reserves ratios. In this case, the central bank will generally need to sell
domestic securities, and the relationship between debt issuance and reserves accumulation is
likely to be weaker.
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and wages, distortionary taxation, a capital accumulation process and open
trade and financial accounts, sticky domestic prices and wages and imperfect
passthrough from import costs to domestic prices. The fiscal position includes
foreign currency reserves and domestic and foreign currency debt. Fiscal policy
is conducted through lump-sum taxes that respond to fluctuations in fiscal ex-
penditure fluctuations and to the debt gap, and through expenditure that may
be pro- or countercyclical. Monetary policy is conducted through a Taylor-type
rule. The model is estimated with Indonesian quarterly data and used to ex-
plore (i) the potential stabilisation role for fiscal policy, and (ii) the interaction
between fiscal and monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview
of the monetary and fiscal policy framework in Indonesia. Section 3 sets out the
model. Section 4 discusses the data and estimation/calibration for three scenar-
ios. Section 5 discusses the impulse response functions, emphasising the effect
of monetary policy on the fiscal accounts and the effect of fiscal policy on the
economy for baseline scenario. Section 6 explores monetary-fiscal interaction
through optimal stabilisation policy experiments for three scenarios. Section 7
concludes.
2.2 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Framework in Indonesia
Prior to 1999 monetary policy in Indonesia targeted base money.The early stage
of Inflation targeting was adopted in 1999. Initially a variety of instruments
were used and by 2005 an interest rate corridor had been established for effec-
tive control over the overnight interest rate.
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In 2003 Indonesia passed a fiscal responsibility act (Law No 17 on State Fi-
nance, 2003), which stipulates that the fiscal debt should not exceed 60 per cent
of GDP and the fiscal deficit should not exceed 3 per cent of GDP. In year 1995-6
Indonesia’s fiscal debt varied from about 25 per cent of GDP to 35 per cent of
GDP, all of which was in foreign currency. The debt increased sharply during
the Asian crisis as the domestic currency sharply depreciated. In 1999 about
half of the debt was converted to domestic currency debt, a share that has been
sustained since. From a peak of almost 90 per cent of GDP in 2000, the fiscal
debt has subsequently fallen sharply to less than 40 per cent of GDP through a
combination of a smaller fiscal deficit, and nominal growth.
The domestic currency, Rupiah, was floated in 1997 and initially depreciated
sharply – by over 60 per cent in real terms – recovered about a third of that by
the end of 1998 and has since appreciated gradually. While the central bank
actively intervenes in the foreign exchange market, the scope of this is small
compared to many Asian countries. Indonesia has a stock of foreign currency
reserves of about 14 per cent of GDPwhich is modest compared to China (about
45 per cent), India (about 25 per cent), Korea (28 per cent) and Singapore (about
100 per cent).
Reserves are held on central bank’s balance sheet. The central bank issues
central bank securities to sterilise intervention and so pays domestic interest
rates, but receives lower foreign currency interest rates on reserves. Although
the stock of reserves is modest, interest earnings cover only about half of inter-
est costs, leading to an intrinsic loss on the central bank’s balance sheet. Apart
from balance sheet risks, this will potentially undermines monetary policy as
a rise in interest rates may deteriorate the central bank’s balance sheet through
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upward pressure on the exchange rate which reduces the domestic currency
value of both the stock of foreign reserves and the associated income. The on-
going losses also potentially undermine monetary policy by requiring ongoing
government financing and creating the incentive to run an easier monetary pol-
icy. Ultimately, the cost of reserves holdings is a fiscal cost that will eventually
find its way to the fiscal accounts through lower seigniorage transfers from the
central bank or through central bank recapitalisation.
The cost of reserves has been handled in a variety of ways in different coun-
tries including increasing central bank capital or setting up contingency funds
to absorb gains and losses, and absorbing the carry cost through noninterest
bearing fiscal deposits at the central bank. In Indonesia, the offsetting effect
of exchange rate fluctuations on foreign currency fiscal debt which is, for now,
larger than reserves holdings, provides a rationale for natural transfers to re-
duce volatility on both central bank’s account and the government accounts.
In Indonesia, the carry cost of holding reserves has been handled in a variety
of ways including extraordinary items and crystalising revaluation gains on the
stock of foreign currency reserves associated with currency depreciation. There
is also a small foreign currency revaluation reserves for absorption of foreign
exchage losses. Ultimately more of the carry cost will need to be borne by the
budget through lower seigniorage payments or new central bank capital.
2.3 The Model
The model is an small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equi.librium
model in the spirit of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and
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Wouters (2003). The domestic economy and fiscal setup is based on Coenen and
Straub (2005) which builds on an earlier version of Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles
(2007). Themodel is extended to account for currency denomination of the fiscal
debt, foreign currency reserves holdings and open trade and financial accounts.
The economy is made up of two types of representative households – Ricardian
households that smooth consumption intertemporally and non Ricardian(Rule
of Thumb) households that consume only current income and receive trans-
fer in terms of subsidy from government, domestic producers, importing firms,
foreign exchange traders, a monetary authority and a fiscal authority. Domes-
tic prices and wages are sticky and passthrough from import costs to domestic
prices is imperfect. Investment adjustment costs are an important real rigidity
in the model. The fiscal debt has a domestic currency component financed by
Ricardian households and a foreign currency component financed by nonresi-
dents. Tax revenue is raised through distortionary income, consumption and
payroll taxes and a lump sum taxes that is responsive to the debt gap and the
fiscal balance. Government expenditure may respond to the output gap.
2.3.1 Household Decisions
There are two types of households: Ricardian households which are forward-
looking and have access to capital markets, where they can trade a full set of con-
tingent securities and buy and lease physical capital. Their budget constraint is:
(1 +  c)Crt + I
r
t +
Bd;rt
Pt
+ (1 + it 1)
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P;r
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= (1  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Ricardian households receive wage income, rental income from capital as-
sets, dividends from firms and the returns on domestic currency bond hold-
ings. They spend their income on consumption Crt , investment in new capital,
It, holdings of domestic currency government bonds, B
d;r
t , debt service on pri-
vate foreign currency debt "tB
P;r
t and and taxes. Taxes are levied on consump-
tion, income and firms’ payrolls at fixed rates  c;  d and w. There is also a
nondistortionary lump sum tax T rt that varies over time.
Ricardian Households maximise the present value of expected utility which
is derived from consumption Crt , and leisure (= 1 N rt ):
maxEt
1X
k=0
k

log
 
Crt+k   hCrt+k 1
  L;t+kN rt+k1+
1 + 

(2.2)
subject to the above budget constraint, and the law of motion of capital:
Kt+1 = (1  )Krt + I;t

It
It 1

It; (2.3)
where L;t is an AR1 labour preference shock,  is the inverse elasticity of labour
supply, Pt is the price level, it is the domestic nominal interest rate, Wt; is the
nominal wage, Krt is the capital holdings of the Ricardian household, RKt is the
real rental cost of capital, Ut is the utilisation rate of capital,Drt are the dividends
paid by Ricardian household owned firms, and "t is the nominal exchange rate.
T rt is lump sum taxes, and  c,  dand ware income, consumption and payroll
taxes respectively. In the capital accumulation equation,  is the rate of depre-
ciation and 

It
It 1

is an investment adjustment cost function that alters the
efficiency through which investment is transformed into productive capital and
I;t is an AR1 investment-specific shock . () is a convex function with proper-
ties (1) = 1; 0 (1) = 0 and " (1) =   < 0. A risk premium proportional to
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the ratio of the net external position to steady-state output,  = (1 + rp
IIPt
PtYt
) is
paid on foreign currency borrowing.
The first order conditions for the Ricardian household’s problem are:
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where t+1  

Crt+1 hCt
Crt hCt 1
 1
is the stochastic discount factor for real 1-
period ahead payoffs, and Qt is the real shadow value of capital in place in
equation (2.5) which is equal to the replacement cost of capital in equation (2.6).
Equation (2.4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between current and
delayed consumption to the discounted real interest rate. Equation (2.5) equates
the consumption cost of an additional unit of capital (Tobin’s q) with the value
of installed capital. The latter is equal to the rental value plus the undepreciated
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stock that carries over to the next period. Equation (2.6) equates the shadow
cost of capital to the marginal cost of the extra unit. The latter is the consump-
tion cost, net of the reduction in future adjustment costs, both adjusted for the
marginal efficiency with which investment is transformed into capital (denom-
inator).3 Equation (2.7) implies equal rates of capital utilisation across house-
holds, and equalises the cost of increasing capacity utilisation to the production
benefit. Equation (2.8) is the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition:which
equates the expected discounted domestic currency returns on holding domes-
tic and foreign bonds. Abstracting from covariance terms, this can be rewritten
as:
1 + it
(1 + it )t
= Et

"t+1
"t

(2.9)
it represents the unobserved foreign cost of capital that makes UIP hold, given
domestic interest rate developments and the risk premium t. The foreign cost
of capital, it , is assumed to follow an AR1 process subject to UIP shocks. It
combines both price (an unobserved combination of foreign interest rates), risk
premia and capital flow effects that are reflected in exchange rate fluctuations.
A share ! of households is assumed not to have access to capital markets
and so can neither save nor borrow and does not invest in capital. As a result
these nonRicardian households cannot behave in a forward-looking consump-
tion smoothing manner. Instead they consume all of their labour income net of
taxes and transfers according to the following budget constraint:
(1 +  c)Cnrt =
(1   d)
(1 + w)
Wt
Pt
Nnrt  
T nrt
Pt
(2.10)
The taxes paid (or transfers received) by nonRicardian households, T nrt , are
3See Medina, Munro and Soto (2007).
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the same as those paid by Ricardian households. Non-Ricardian households
have substantially lower incomes than Ricardian households due to the absence
of capital income.
Labour Supply and Wage Setting
Each household provides a differentiated labour service. Following Erceg et al
(2000), households set wages in a staggered fashion. Wages are renegotiated
with probability (1-w) each period, while a fraction w of households index
wages to either last period’s wage inflation or the central bank’s inflation target
according to the following rule:
 w;t =  w;t 1

Wt 1
Wt 2
w
(1 + )(1 w) (2.11)
where w is the share of non-optimising households indexing to last period’s
wage inflation.
A household resetting its wage in period twill maximise utility (2.2) with re-
spect to the real wage, and taking into account aggregate wage dynamics (2.11)
and the demand for its differentiated labour service, i:
Ni;t+k =

W i;t
Wt+k
 w
Nt+k
where W t represents the wage chosen by the optimising household at time t.
and the parameter w =
1+w
w
, where w is the steady state wage markup. The
renegotiating household solves the following problem:
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The first order condition for that optimization problem sets the discounted
marginal utility of income from an additional unit of labour equal to the ex-
pected discounted disutility of the additional labour effort:
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This lead to the following dynamics for the real wage:
(1 + )wrt = Etwrt+1 + wrt 1
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wt 1 + (1  w)t
where wrt is the log of the real wage.
In the limit where all households renegotiate (w = 0), this condition (2.12)
reduces to the condition that the real wage equals the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure, inclusive of all taxes:
(1   d)
(1 + w)
Wt
Pt
= (1 +  c)L;t
(Nt)

Ct
2.3.2 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption, labour input and lump sum taxes/transfers are
weighted averages of the optimising and non-Ricardian households:
Ct = !C
nr
t + (1  !)Crt
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Investment, capital, bonds and dividend receipts of the Ricardian household
are adjusted for the Ricardian share to give aggregate per capita values:
It = (1  !)Irt ; Kt = (1  !)Krt ; Dt = (1  !)Drt
Bdt = (1  !)Bd;rt ; BPt = (1  !)BP;r;t
Labour input is equal as both Ricardian and non-Ricardian households meet
demand given the wage set by Ricardian households.
Nt = N
nr
t = N
r
t
and lump sum taxes are assumed to be equal across households.
Tt = T
nr
t = T
r
t
2.3.3 Final Goods Firms
Differentiated intermediate goods are combined using a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) aggregator of home and foreign goods to form consumption
and investment goods,
Ct (j) =


1= H
C (CH;t (j))
 H 1
 H + (1  C)1= H (CF;t (j))
 H 1
 H
  H
 H 1
It (j) =


1= H
I (CH;t (j))
 H 1
 H + (1  I)1= H (IF;t (j))
 H 1
 H
  H H 1
where  H is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
and C and I define their respective weights in consumption and investment,
where investment is much more import intensive than consumption. The op-
timal composition of the bundles is obtained by minimizing its cost. This min-
imization problem determines the demands for home and foreign goods by the
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household, CH;t (j), CF;t (j) IH;t (j), IF;t (j) respectively, which are given by
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C
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Pt
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I
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  H
It (j) ; (2.13)
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Pt
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(2.14)
where PH;t and PF;t are the price indices of home and foreign goods, and PC;t and
PI;t are the price indices of the consumption and investment bundles, defined
as:
PC;t =

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
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Similarly, home goods are exported and used as an input into a foreign con-
sumption good. The foreign demand for home goods is:
Xt = 


PH;t
"tP t
  F
Y t (j) (2.15)
where   is the foreign elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
and  is the steady state share of domestic goods in foreign GDP.
2.3.4 Intermediate Goods Producing Firms
Intermediate goods are produced using constant returns to scale technology:
Yt = a;tK

t N
(1 )
t    (2.16)
and their profit maximisation setting is :
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where  is a fixed cost of production chosen to ensure zero profits in steady
state, and a;t represents a transitory technology shock. Taking the rental cost of
capital and real wage as fixed, cost minimisation implies the following rate of
substitution between capital and labour:
Kt
Nt
=


1  

Wt
PtRKt

(2.18)
Real marginal cost is given by:
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[where  = =Y is the ratio of fixed cost to steady state GDP.]
Following Calvo (1983), differentiated intermediate goods firms set prices in
a staggered fashion. Each firm resets prices with probability (1-H) each period,
while a fraction H index prices to last period’s inflation. Firms that do not op-
timise at time t index prices to a geometric average  p;t of last period’s inflation
and the inflation target:
 p;t =  p;t 1 (1 + t 1)
H (1 + )1 H
where H is the share of nonoptimising firms that index to past inflation. A
firm resetting its price in period t optimises the present value of expected profits
subject to the dynamics of aggregate inflation and demand from final goods
producers (equation 2.13) and foreign consumers.
maxEt
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
46
P i;t represents the price chosen by a firms that repotimises at time t. The first
order condition for optimal price setting in period t is:
Et
 1X
k=0
kpt+kYi;t+kP

i;t p;t+k   (1 + p;t+k)MCt+k
!
= 0
This setup leads to the following inflation dynamics (check):
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(1  H)(1  H)
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(mcrt   pH;t) + H;t (2.21)
wheremcrt is the log deviation of real marginal cost from steady state, and H;t
is an iid cost push shock.
In steady state the price is set as a markup over marginal cost. In the limit
where all firms reoptimise (H = 0), the price is set equal to marginal cost. The
domestic firm also satisfies export demand at the price PH;t.
2.3.5 Importing Firms
We introduce local-currency price stickiness in order to allow for incomplete
exchange rate pass-through into import prices in the short-run. Competitive
importers use CES technology to combine a continuum of differentiated im-
ported varieties to produce a final foreign good YF . This good is consumed by
households and used for assembling new capital goods. The optimal mix of im-
ported varieties in the final foreign good defines the demands for each of them.
In particular, the demand for variety zF is given by:
YF;t(zF ) =

PF;t(zF )
PF;t
 F
YF;t; (2.22)
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where F is the elasticity of substitution among imported varieties, PF;t(zF ) is
the domestic-currency price of imported variety zF in the domestic market, and
PF;t is the aggregate price of import goods in this market.
Each importing firm has monopoly power in the domestic retailing of a par-
ticular variety. Each firm resets prices with probability (1-F ) each period Firms
that do not optimise at time t index prices to a geometric average  F;t of last
period’s inflation and the inflation target:
 F;t =  F;t 1 (1 + t 1)
F (1 + )1 F
where pis the share of nonoptimising firms that index to past inflation.
Therefore, when a generic importing firm zF receives a signal, it chooses a new
price by maximizing the present value of expected profits:
max
PF;t(zF )
Et
( 1X
i=0
t;t+i
i
F
 iF;tPF;t(zF )  Et+iP t+i(zF )
PC;t+i
YF;t+i(zF )
)
;
subject to the domestic demand for variety zF (2.22) and the updating rule for
prices. For simplicity, we assume that P t (zF ) = P t for all zF .
In this setup, the optimal path for imported inflation is given by a New Key-
nesian Philips curve with indexation. In its log-linear form, imported goods
inflation has both a forward and backward looking component and depends on
the marginal real import cost.
bF;t = 
1 + F
Et fbF;t+1g+ 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1 + F
F;t 1
+
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F )(1  F )
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Changes in the nominal exchange rate are passed through gradually into
prices of imported good sold domestically. Therefore, exchange rate pass-
through will be incomplete in the short-run. In the long-run firms freely adjust
their prices, so the law-of-one-price holds up to a constant.
In the steady state the price is set as a markup over marginal cost real import
cost. In the limit where all importing firms re-optimise (F = 0), .passthrough
is complete and PF;t = etP t .
2.3.6 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor-type rule that is sensitive to in-
flation above target and to the log deviation of output from steady state, yt:
it = 'iit 1 + (1  'i)

't+1 + 'ybyt+ r;t (2.23)
where r;t is an AR1 process.
2.3.7 Fiscal Policy
The nominal net fiscal position is defined as foreign currency reserves, Zt less
domestic and foreign currency fiscal debt, Bdt and B
f
t :
NFPt  "tZt  Bdt   "tBft (2.24)
While reserves are held by the central bank, they are viewed here as a fiscal as-
set: ultimately the costs or benefits of reserves holdingswill showup in the fiscal
accounts through higher/lower seigniorage transfers, or recapitalisation of the
49
central bank. The domestic debt is assumed to be held by households and the
foreign debt is assumed to be held by non residents. Current expenditures, debt
repayment, and reserves accumulation are financed through tax revenue, new
borrowing and earnings on foreign reserves according to the following budget
constraint:
"tZt  Bdt   "tBft = (1 + it 1)"tZt 1   (1 + it 1)Bdt 1
 (1 + it 1)t"tBft 1 + FBt (2.25)
where it is the nominal interest rate on foreign bonds, and FBt is the primary
fiscal balance (tax income less expenditures).
Note that foreign currency borrowing is at a premium(
"t(BG;t+BPt  Zft )
PtYt
) over
the foreign interest rate, while foreign currency reserves earn the risk free for-
eign interest rate. In steady state, the domestic and foreign borrowing costs
are equal (i = i   rp IIPPY )4 according to the UIP condition As long as the net
fiscal position is negative, there is a carry cost on foreign currency reserves pro-
portional to the risk premium. Note also that accumulating reserves through
sterilised intervention does not affect the risk premium. To illustrate the cur-
rency valuation effects and carry cost, the fiscal budget constraint (2.25) can be
rewritten:
NFPt = (1 + it 1NFPt 1) + FBt
+

   it 1   it 1+ ( "t"t 1   1)it 1 +

"t
"t 1
  1

"t 1Zt 1
+

it 1   it 1 + rp
IIPt 1
Pt 1Yt 1

"t 1B
f
t 1
 

"t
"t 1
  1

it 1   rp
IIPt 1
Pt 1Yt 1

"t 1B
f
t 1 (2.26)
 

"t
"t 1
  1

"t 1B
f
t 1 (2.27)
4rp is positive and the net international investment position is negative.
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where the second lines shows the carry cost and the currency valuation ef-
fects on the interest flows and stocks respectively for reserves, the third line
shows the interest wedge on foreign currency debt which is zero in steady state,
the last two lines show the currency valuation effects on the stock and flow
of foreign currency debt. In steady state, all revaluation effects are zero, and
i = i   rp NFPPY so that the fiscal balance must cover interest payments on the
net fiscal position plus the steady state carry cost of reserves. In the model setup
the carry cost exists in steady state because UIP works between the domestic in-
terest rate and a foreign rate plus risk premium, whereas reserves earn the risk
free foreign rate.
In a countrywith foreign currency debt greater than reserves such as Indone-
sia, reserves accumulation will reduce the effects of exchange rate fluctuations
on the fiscal position. However any remaining mismatch will lead to fluctua-
tions on the fiscal accounts, and because of the impact of fiscal fluctuations on
nonRicardian households, deficit stabilisation may not be an attractive policy.
Depreciation of the domestic currency deteriorates the net fiscal position, but
by less than it would in the absence of reserves.
The fiscal balance is:
FBt = 
d

1
(1 + w)
WtNt +Dt + PtR
K
t UtKt   PtKt

+ cPtCt+
wWtNt+Tt PH;tGt
(2.28)
Fiscal policy is defined by Bdt , B
f
t ; Z
f
t ,Gt and Tt so four of the five need to be
defined by fiscal rules. First, the ratio of reserves to steady state GDP is assumed
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to follow an AR(1) process, subject to "reserve accumulation shocks". Reserves
shocks are not included in the UIP equation and so do not have a direct effect on
the exchange rate. Intervention can be sterilised through the interest rate rule,
through a rise in domestic currency fiscal debt.
"tZt
PtY
=

"t 1Zt 1
Pt 1Y
z  "Z
PY
1 z
ez;t (2.29)
Second, we assume a portfolio rebalancing rule that keeps the share of for-
eign currency debt stable:
"tB
f
t
Bdt
=

1   (2.30)
where  is the foreign currency share of fiscal debt.
Third, the ratio of Gt to GDP is defined by a simple fiscal rule:
gt = ggt 1 + 'gyyt + g;t (2.31)
where gt = (Gt  G) =Y and yt is the log deviation of output from steady
state. The fiscal authority adjusts expenditure gradually back to the steady state
level in response to expenditure shocks g;t and may play an active stabilisation
role through the output gap term If 'gy is zero, fiscal expenditure follows a pas-
sive AR1 process. If 'gy is negative, fiscal expenditure will be countercyclical.
At 'gy =-1, fiscal expenditure fully offsets the output gap.
Finally, taxes are adjusted in response to deviations of debt and government
spending from their steady state levels relative to GDP:
tt = 'tbbt + 'tggt (2.32)
52
where 'b; 'g > 0; tt = (Tt=Pt   T=P ) =Y and Bt = ("tBft + Bdt )=PtY   (Bf +
Bd)=PY .5 Under this rule, government expenditure shocks will be financed
through a combination of a taxes (as 'g approaches unity a rise in Gt will be
financed by a rise in taxes) and debt (as 'g approaches zero a rise in Gt will be
financed by debt). The coefficient 'b ensures a feedback response to debt above
steady state and must be large enough to ensure solvency.
The steady state level of debt/GDP will be determined by several factors
including the steady state level of taxes T=PY and spending G=Y , steady state
growth and inflation, and the steady state carry on reserves.
2.3.8 Aggregate Equilibrium
Domestic firms satisfy demand for home goods:
Yt = CH;t + IH;t +Gt +Xt
Similarly, importing firms demand for imports:
Mt = CF;t + IF;t
Nominal GDP is:
PY;tYt = PtCt + PH;tGt + PI;tIt + PH;tXt   etP t Mt
5This simplifies the log linear representation. and defines these variables as percent of steady
state GDP.
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2.3.9 External Sector : Balance of Payment
Combining the households’ budget constraints, the fiscal budget constraint, the
definition of profits and the resource constraints we get the nominal balance of
payments identity:
"tZt "t

Bft  BPt

= "t(1+i

t 1)Zt 1 "t(1+it 1)

BfG;t 1 +B
P
t 1

+PX;tXt PH;tMt
(2.33)
The change in the external position is equal to the current account: the in-
vestment income account and the trade balance. Note that the private sector is
assumed to have no external assets or liabilities, so that the investment income
account is the net flows associated with fiscal debt and reserves.
The real exchange rate is defined as:
RERt =
"tP

Pt
(2.34)
2.4 Model Solution and Estimation
We use Dynare6 for model solution and estimation. Posterior parameters are es-
timated using a Bayesian approach (DeJong, Ingram, andWhiteman, 2000) . We
set prior distributions p () for the parameters based mainly on their theoreti-
cal bounds and previous studies, but including country specific circumstances
where relevant. We include in the model measurement equations that relate ob-
served variables to model variables. Data for observable variables YT is used to
form a joint posterior distribution p
 
 j YT  by updating the prior distribution
6See www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/ .
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based on the likelihood function L( j YT ) using Bayes’ theorem.
p
 
# j YT  = L(# j YT )p (#)R
L(# j YT )p (#) d# (2.35)
An approximated solution for the posterior distribution is computed using
theMetropolis-Hastings algorithm. The posteriors are the last 50% of two chains
of 100,000 draws each.
2.4.1 Calibrated Parameters
To simplify the estimation procedure, some parameters are calibrated. These
are shown in Table 2.1 Values are chosen based on observed aggregate ratios
and tax rates, to give reasonable steady state values, and to be consistent with
the DSGE literatures.
2.4.2 Estimated Parameters: Priors
We choose priors based on regularities of Indonesian data, and the DSGE liter-
ature. These are shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. For the share of rule of thumb
consumers, we choose a fairly flat prior centered on 0.5. The prior for the risk
premium parameter is chosen to be consistent with a steady state risk premium
of about 4 per cent per annum. Priors for Calvo parameters are centered on 0.75
and price and wage indexation parameters on 0.5.
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2.4.3 Estimated Parameters: Posterior Means
Posterior mean estimates are shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. for the three esti-
mation periods and the distributions for the inflation target period are shown
in Figure 2.2. The parameter estimates are reasonably robust across periods de-
spite potential nonlinearities associatedwith the 1997-8 Asian crisis and changes
such as the exchange rate float in 1998, adoption of inflation targeting in 1999
and the change in the foreign currency denomination of debt from 100% before
the crisis to about 50% afterwards.
Posterior parameter estimates are all reasonable relative to estimatedmodels
for other countries, although in a few cases, parameters are not well identified as
seen in Figure 1. This includes. the risk premium parameter rp, the fixed cost
of production, , the capacity utilisation parameter,  , the Calvo parameters,
and the monetary policy response to inflation '. The Calvo parameters will
have an important effect on the results of our monetary policy experiments.
The share of nonRicardian consumers, an important parameter for our
model is estimated at 67 percent and is well identified. This compares to cal-
ibrated values of 0.5 for the Euro area (Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2005), 0.37 for the
US, (Gali et al,2007), and estimates of 0.25 to 0.35 for the Euro area (Coenen and
Straub, 2005). The share of nonRicardian agents falls slightly over time.
The habit parameter is low for the baseline scenario and increases markedly
in the ricardians scenario, implying ricardians household ability to smooth their
consumption more than nonricardians. The risk premium parameter is lower
for more recent periods. The investment adjustment cost parameter  which is
changes the curvature of the investment adjustment cost function increases in
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the ricardians scenario, along with the increasing investment.
While the Calvo parameters are not well identified, indexation is estimated
to be highest for imports (three quarters of non-optimising firms index to past
inflation), followed by home goods (about half index to past inflation) and low-
est for wages (only about a third index to past inflation). Price indexation is
lower for ricardians scenario.
The estimated monetary policy parameters imply a fairly standard Taylor
rule, although the response to inflation is not well identified in the ricardian
scenario. The estimated fiscal policy parameters imply strongly countercycli-
cal government expenditure, a small tax response to debt, and mainly debt fi-
nancing of fluctuations in expenditure in the baseline scenario. However, this
countercyclical policy is even stronger for ricardians scenario as response for
the crowding out effect of government expenditure to GDP.
Across the scenarios, monetary policy parameters relatively stable implying
a conservative role of monetary policy guarding against both inflation and out-
put. on the other hand, fiscal parameters are relatively dynamic for the role as a
countercyclical agent.
2.5 Impulse Response Functions : Baseline
Impulse Response functions are shown in Appendix B.
A one standard deviation monetary policy shock implies a rise in the central
bank securities interest rate. This shock depressed aggregate demand, both con-
sumption and investment. The exchange rate appreciates which reduces the
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cost of investment goods, in particular, somewhat offsetting the fall in invest-
ment Fiscal expenditure is countercyclical and so increases to partly offset the
fall in output. The rise in expenditure is partly financed by an increase in debt
(the net fiscal position worsens, despite the exchange rate appreciation which
reduced the value of foreign currency debt) and partly by a rise in taxes. The
rise in taxes is protracted and depresses nonRicardian consumption for a pro-
tracted period. Ricardian households reduce consumption briefly.
A one standard deviation fiscal policy shock implies an increase in the gov-
ernment spending /GDP ratio which directly increases GDP. The increase in
government expenditure is partly financed by debt (the net fiscal position de-
creases) and partly financed by a protracted rise in taxes. The latter depresses
nonRicardian consumption for a considerable period. In contrast, Ricardian
consumption falls briefly and then rises above trend after about 8 quarters. The
fall in consumption puts downward pressure on inflation. The monetary policy
response to the output gap (tightening) dominates themonetary policy response
to inflation (easing), and the interest rate rises, putting upward pressure on the
exchange rate.
A one standard deviation reserves accumulation shock implies an increase in
the reserves/GDP ratio. The increase in reserves is financed partly by an in-
crease in debt and partly by a rise in taxes. Overall the net fiscal position im-
proves (it is not fully financed by debt) which reduces the risk premium The
rise in taxes depresses nonRicardian consumption and GDP. The fall in demand
puts downward pressure on inflation. The monetary authority responds to the
fall in output and inflation by reducing the interest rate and the exchange rate
depreciates. The fiscal authority responds to the fall in output by increasing
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government spending which adds to inflation.
An exogenous exchange rate depreciation is interpreted as a rise in the cost of
foreign capital. The exchange rate depreciation leads to an improvement of the
trade account – the export response is strong ( F is 1.75) and final goods firms
substitute away from imported goods - which dominates the fall in consump-
tion and investment. In response to the rise in GDP, government spending falls
allowing a cut in lump sum taxes. The fall in taxes leads to a rise in nonRicar-
dian consumption While the value of the foreign currency debt increases, this is
largely offset by an increase in the value of foreign currency reserves and fluctu-
ations in the net fiscal position are dominated by the effects of expenditure and
tax receipts.
We also include impulse responses for a combined government spending and
cost push shock to domestic prices as a proxy for subsidy removal. The impulse
responses are very similar to a pure price shock. This is because the fall in gov-
ernment expenditure is mainly absorbed in lower debt, rather than taxes, and
so has a small effect. The increase in prices reduces the real wage which de-
presses nonRicardian consumption. The nominal interest rate rises in response
to the higher inflation and so the nominal exchange rate appreciates. However
the real interest rate does not rise because of the effect of the falls in govern-
ment expenditure and nonRicardian consumption on the output gap. So the
real exchange rate does not rise.
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2.6 Optimal Stabilisation Policy Experiments
2.6.1 Can fiscal policy play a stabilisation role?
As was seen in the impulse response functions, a rise in government expen-
diture leads to a fall in consumption (particularly nonRicardian consump-
tion) and downward pressure on inflation. In this section we use a standard
quadratic loss function to (i) look at the optimal values for fiscal and monetary
policy parameters, (ii) ask whether fiscal policy can/does play a stabilising role;
(ii) if so, ask which factors (e.g. nonRicardian households, sticky prices and
wages, and distortionary taxation) give fiscal policy a stabilisation role, and (iv)
explore the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy parameters.
We assume a standard loss function :
Loss =
1X
0
2 + 0:5y2
where y is the percent deviation from steady state and , and r are percent-
age deviations from steady state. This type of loss function approximates wel-
fare in a small New Keynesian model as discussed in Rudebush and Svensson
(1999) and Woodford (2003). There are good reasons why it may not approx-
imate welfare in this model, including debt and capital stocks, open economy
features and nonRicardian agents. Ideally, the analysis would be done in a sec-
ond order model, however this was beyond the scope of this paper. We view
the standard loss function as a general approximation of a policy-maker’s objec-
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tive function: to achieve both inflation and output stability. However, we also
present figures showing the effect of the policy parameters on consumption to
reflect the importance of consumption in welfare ie. utility, in a 3 equation New
Keynesian model GDP is equal to consumption, and potential poverty consid-
erations associated with nonRicardian agents who have lower incomes and can-
not use credit to smooth consumption intertemporally. Because exchange rate
volatility is also an often cited concern for policy makers in an open economy,
we present figures showing the effect of policy parameters on exchange rate
volatility.
Gali and Gertler (2007) argue that the output gap term should be the devia-
tion from the flex price equilibrium, rather than the deviation of steady state. In
this model with a high estimated share of nonRicardian agents, however, flex-
ible domestic prices and wages, in particular, imply volatility in nonRicardian
consumption and therefore output. So while, in theory, we would like to push
the economy toward an efficient flex price adjustment path rather than all the
way to steady state in a small model with Ricardian agents, here it would mean
pushing the economy to a more volatile path. Therefore we stick to the devia-
tion from steady state.
We also carry out stochastic simulations and for a range of values of each
policy parameter we plot the loss function for each scenario. We also plot the
variances of inflation, GDP, consumption and the real exchange rate. Because of
uncertainty about the form of the welfare function, the results presented should
be interpreted with a good degree of caution, especially in terms of optimal pa-
rameter values. What we aim to achieve in this section is a better understanding
of the types of tradeoffs faced by policy makers relative to variables of interest.
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Figure 3 show the results for the monetary policy response to inflation, '.
Losses are smaller for the ricardians scenario. For the other two scenarios, losses
increase rapidly as the parameter approaches unity, by which point the model
becomes indeterminate consistent with the Taylor Principle where the nominal
interest rate should be increased at least one-for-one with inflation to prevent
a drop in the real interest rate. For the ricardian scenario, the Taylor principle
appears to be less binding. This may reflect both a fall in price indexation and
stronger countercylical fiscal policyfor the ricardians. In this scenario losses are
not very sensitive to this parameter. Estimated values are in the range 1.7 to 1.8,
but not well identified, compared to a minimum standard loss function at 1.9 to
2.8. However, the model suggests that a policymaker concernedwith consump-
tion or real exchange rate volatility, would prefer a relatively weak response to
inflation (' of about 1.2) while keeping to the Taylor Principle.
The result for the monetary policy response to the output gap 'y is shown in
Figure 4. The results for the baseline and mixed periods show a minimum loss
at a value for 'y of about 0.8. For the ricardian scenario the minimum loss is
at a value higher than normally considered practical. The estimated values are
more moderate than a standard loss function would suggest. A policy maker
concerned with consumption volatility would also prefer a strong interest rate
response to inflation. However, in an open economy, concern for exchange rate
volatility would suggest a more moderate response to avoid excessive move-
ment.
The results for the interest rate smoothing parameter r is shown in Figure 5.
Losses are not very sensitive to this parameter until it approaches unity at which
point the nominal interest rate follows a randomwalk. Its effect on consumption
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is similar. Thus, real exchange rate volatility is minimised as well.
The result for the tax response to debt 'tb is shown in Figure 6. The loss func-
tion is not very sensitive to this parameter except at values close to zero, at
which point the debt solvency condition is not met in the case explosive debt.
The estimated values show a weak response to debt. A policy maker concerned
with consumption volatility would want to respond only weakly to deviations
of the debt from steady state – enough to keep the debt in check, but effectively
use it as a shock absorber. This is consistent with the literature which suggests
that fiscal policy should respond to the debt gap to ensure solvency, but that
debt should only be brought back to target gradually. However, at very small
values, the debt becomes volatile, and because of its effect on the risk premium,
this leads to exchange rate volatility. Therefore there is a tradeoff between con-
sumption and real exchange rate stability.
The result for the tax response to fiscal expenditure 'tg is shown in Figure 7.
This parameter determines the degree to which fluctuations in fiscal expendi-
ture are financed by an increase in taxes. The estimated values are small, sug-
gesting a high degree of debt financing, consistent with rising losses with tax
financing. This result reflects the effect of movements in lump sum taxes of
nonRicardian household income and consumption. Thus it is efficient to use
the debt as a shock absorber, and vary taxes only a little. In contrast, real ex-
change rate volatility increases with greater debt financing because fluctuations
in debt increase exchange rate volatility through the risk premium, but this is
still relatively weak.
The fiscal expenditure response to the output gap 'gy is the active fiscal stabili-
sation instrument. The loss function (Figure 8) achieves a minimum at a value
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well belowwhat might be considered practical. (At a value of -1, the output gap
is fully offset by government expenditure). Estimated values are a more modest
range of -0.7 to -1, but still suggesting a substantial fiscal stabilisation role. As
can be seen, a policymaker would prefer amoremodest countercylical response
with 'gy in the range of -0.3 to -0.6, representing their concern with consump-
tion volatility that is closer proxy to a welfare measure than output volatility or
real exchange rate volatility.
In Figures 9 and 10, we consider monetary policy in the absence of active
fiscal stabilisation (i.e. 'gy =0). In this single policy tango situation, the increases
are mostly due to higher GDP volatility. If fiscal policy were to become solely
concerned with good housekeeping, leaving stabilisation to monetary policy
alone, monetary policy could achieve a better outcome through a less aggressive
response to inflation and a more aggressive response to the output gap, and less
interest rate smoothing referring to less aggressive policy in general. However,
the outcomes are never as good as in the case where fiscal policy is active.
2.6.2 Mixed Policy and Stabilisation role
Let us consider the scenario when monetary and fiscal policy behave as if the
economy is assumed to be all ricardian households, while in reality the share of
non ricardian households is 62% as estimated from baseline scenario.Therefore,
all policy parameters are taken from all-ricardian scenario, but the economy is
based on baseline scenario. This scenario is called mixed, representing a mis-
guided policy measures, however practically some countries may adopt this
policy when their statistic offices publish incorrect poverty information, ei-
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ther from poverty line calculation or political pressures to show government
achievement for lowering poverty rate.
Figures 3 to 8 also show the loss function for stabilisation using mixed policy
scenario, together with baseline and ricardian scenario. As can be seen, mixed
policy scenario creates bigger loss to the economy, simply because policy under
all-ricardian assumption is relatively more aggresive than baseline policy. For
instance, fiscal expenditure response to the output gap 'gy under all-ricardian
scenario is -1.1, compare to -0.73 under baseline scenario. Under baseline sce-
nario, any shock associated with economic overheat will be responded by trim-
ming government expenditure or tax increase to reduce consumption. For ex-
ample, subsidiy reduction will trigger a drop on people purchasing power. That
drop is reflected at real wages and weaken the consumption of non ricardian
household. Under mixed policy, an example for aggresive fiscal policy is sub-
sidy removal, which further worsen the purchasing power thus consumption
of non ricardian household. Thefore, the policy of eliminating subsidy should
be carried out in a cautious way. Although monetary can provide an optimal
countercyclical response by raising interest rate, the direct impact of subsidy re-
moval will be the declining consumption of the poor household for an extended
period of time. Considering that poor household consumption is also one rep-
resentative of public welfare, a public policy is only appropiate if it emphasized
efforts to optimize public welfare, as reflected in public consumption dynamics.
One of important argument is the reality that subsidy on domestic agricultural
products is still maintained, even in several advanced country such as US and
European union.
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2.6.3 Summary of Findings
We find that fiscal policy can and does play a stabilising role in Indonesia. Gov-
ernment expenditure is estimated to countercyclical. A tax response to vari-
ations in expenditure is undesirable because expenditure is playing an active
stabilisation role and because non Ricardian income and therefore consumption
is directly affected by variations in taxes. Taxes respond to debt above target, by
enough to ensure solvency, but to only gradually return debt to steady state.
Therefore the fiscal debt plays an important shock absorber role facilitating
countercyclical policy while avoiding large fluctuations in taxes which would
lead to volatility in nonRicardian consumption. Estimated fiscal and monetary
policy parameters look sensible in terms of the variance tradeoffs in the model.
The features in our model that could give fiscal policy an active stabilisa-
tion role are a large estimated share of non-Ricardian households 67 per cent
of households, price and wage rigidities, and distortionary taxes. Of these,
only nonRicardian agents are found to be important. Therefore, optimal policy
measure should consider this type of household.Exclusion of the non-Ricardian
households will result in sub-optimal policy toward optimising social welfare
In the absence of active fiscal policy, monetary policy would give the best
outcomes, in terms of a standard loss function, by being less responsive to infla-
tion and more responsive to the output gap.
The size of the stocks of debt and reserves have little effect on macrostabil-
isation outcomes, within reasonable limits. Fluctuations due to exchange rate
valuation effects are absorbed into the debt, which is fine as long as the tax re-
sponse to debt is large enough to ensure solvency. While the size of the reserves
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stock has little effect on stabilisation dynamics, it is, of course, still important
for financial stability considerations.
In the model foreign reserves accumulation is contractionary and leads to a
depreciation even in the absence of a direct effect on the exchange rate. How-
ever fiscal expenditure is a more effective instrument for influencing the ex-
change rate. An increase in reserves depreciates the exchange rate by consid-
erably less than an equivalent cut in government expenditure. Countercyclical
fiscal policy helps to reduce real exchange rate volatility. At the end, a policy
tango is superior to monetary policy alone.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Description Calibrated Value
 subjective discount rate 0.99
 capital share 0.38
 depreciation rate 0.025
H steady state markup (home goods) 0.3
F steady state markup (imports) 0.3
W steady state markup (wages) 0.3
G steady state gov’t spending/GDP 0.88
B steady state fiscal debt/GDP 0.30
Z steady state reserves/GDP 0.10
 foreign curr. share of fiscal debt 0.50
 c consumption tax rate 0.10
 d income tax rate 0.10
w payroll tax rate 0.075
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Table 2.2: Priors
Parameter Distribution Mean/ StdDev/
Mode Deg. Free
! share of nonRicardian consumers Beta 0.5 0.2
h habit parameter Beta 0.5 0.2
rp risk premium parameter Gamma 0.008 0.003
 inverse elasticity of labour supply Gamma 2 0.75
 fixed cost of production Beta 0.3 0.1
 investment adjustment costs Gamma 3.0 1.5
 cap. util. parameter Gamma 0.2 0.075
 H home goods demand elasticity Gamma 1 0.5
 F export demand elasticity Gamma 1 0.5
Price & wage parameters
H Calvo parameter home goods Beta 0.75 0.15
H indexation: home goods Beta 0.5 0.2
F Calvo parameter imports Beta 0.75 0.15
F indexation: imports Beta 0.5 0.2
w Calvo wage parameter Beta 0.75 0.15
w wage indexation parameter Beta 0.5 0.2
Policy parameters
r Interest smoothing parameter Beta 0.8 0.1
' MP: inflation response Normal 1.7 0.15
'y MP output response Normal 0.5 0.05
g Fiscal smoothing parameter Beta 0.85 0.1
'gy FP: expenditure response to y Normal 0 0.5
'tb FP: tax response to debt Beta 0.5 0.2
'tg FP: tax response to expenditure Beta 0.5 0.2
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Table 2.3: Priors
Parameter Distribution Mean/ St Dev/
Mode Deg Free
AR1 coefficients:
a technology shock Beta 0.85 0.1
g fiscal shock Beta 0.85 0.1
I investment adj Beta 0.85 0.1
L labour preference Beta 0.85 0.1
i foreign cost of capital Beta 0.85 0.1
y foreign demand Beta 0.80 0.1
z reserves shock Beta 0.75 0.15
Shock standard deviations:
a technology shock Inv Gamma 0.07 2
g fiscal expenditure shock Inv Gamma 0.1 2
I investment adj shock Inv Gamma 0.1 2
L labour pref shock Inv Gamma 0.1 2
r monetary policy shock Inv Gamma 0.02 2
y foreign demand shock Inv Gamma 0.1 2
i foreign cost of capital shock Inv Gamma 0.1 2
p price cost push shock Inv Gamma 0.04 2
w wage cost push shock Inv Gamma 0.01 2
z reserves accumulation shock Inv Gamma 0.4 2
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Table 2.4: Posterior Estimates
Parameter Baseline Ricardians Mixed
Scenario Scenario Scenario
! share of nonRicardian consumers 0.67 0.10 0.67
h habit parameter 0.15 0.59 0.10
 inverse elasticity of labour supply 0.90 0.99 0.89
rp risk premium parameter 0.0090 0.0077 0.0089
 fixed cost of production 0.31 0.30 0.29
 investment adjustment costs 0.57 0.83 0.38
 cap. util. parameter 0.17 0.23 0.14
 H home goods demand elasticity 0.77 0.99 0.58
 F export demand elasticity 1.90 1.92 1.86
Price & wage parameters
H Calvo Parameter home goods 0.83 0.78 0.90
H indexation: home goods 0.73 0.55 0.75
F Calvo parameter imports 0.71 0.74 0.81
F indexation: imports 0.49 0.36 0.48
w Calvo wage parameter 0.75 0.76 0.84
w wage indexation parameter 0.11 0.15 0.09
Policy Parameters
r MP: interest smoothing 0.86 0.87 0.87
' MP: inflation response 1.87 1.68 1.68
'y MP output response 0.45 0.48 0.48
g Fiscal smoothing parameter 0.72 0.72 0.72
'gy FP: expenditure response to y -0.73 -1.10 -1.10
'tb FP: tax response to debt 0.25 0.12 0.12
'tg FP: tax response to expenditure 0.20 0.13 0.13
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Table 2.5: Posterior Estimates
Parameter Baseline Ricardians Mixed
Scenario Scenario Scenario
AR1 coefficients:
a technology shock 0.59 0.52 0.62
I investment adj 0.80 0.68 0.85
L labour preference 0.96 0.92 0.99
i foreign cost of capital 0.86 0.65 0.86
y foreign demand 0.86 0.78 0.86
z reserves shock 0.86 0.89 0.87
Shock standard deviations:
a technology shock 0.12 0.08 0.11
g fiscal expenditure shock 0.08 0.10 0.08
I investment adj shock 0.21 0.22 0.15
L labour pref shock 0.09 0.10 0.08
r monetary policy shock 0.0084 0.0061 0.0081
y foreign demand shock 0.29 0.30 0.28
i foreign cost of capital shock 0.029 0.032 0.028
p price cost push shock 0.023 0.020 0.022
w wage cost push shock 0.0039 0.0036 0.0034
z reserves accumulation shock 0.21 0.13 0.20
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Figure 2.1: Priors and Posteriors Distribution
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Figure 2.2:
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Figure 2.3: Monetary response to Inflation
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Figure 2.5: Monetary Policy Response to the Output Gap
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Figure 2.6: Interest rate Smoothing Parameter
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Figure 2.7: Tax response to Debt
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Figure 2.8: Tax Response to Govt Expenditure
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Figure 2.9: Government Expenditure Response to the Output Gap
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Figure 2.10: Shift in Loss Function in Absence of Fiscal Stabilisation ('gy = 0)
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Figure 2.11: Shift in Loss Function in Absence of Fiscal Stabilisation ('gy = 0)
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Impulse Response Functions : Baseline
Figure 2.13: Response to a 1 Std Dev Productivity Shock
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Figure 2.14: Response to a 1 Std Dev Gov’t Spending Shock
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Figure 2.15: Response to a 1 Std Dev Investment Cost Shock
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Figure 2.16: Response to a 1 Std Dev Foreign Cost of Capital Shock
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Figure 2.17:
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Figure 2.18: Response to a 1 Std Dev Labour Preference Shock
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Figure 2.19: Response to a 1 Std Dev Cost Push Shock
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Figure 2.20: Response to a 1 Std Dev Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 2.21: Response to a 1 Std Dev Wage Shock
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Figure 2.22: Response to a 1 Std Dev Foreign Demand Shock
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Figure 2.23: Response to a 1 Std Dev Reserves Accumulation Shock
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Figure 2.24: Response to Subsidy Removal (Combined Cost Push and Fiscal
Shock)
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CHAPTER 3
CHAPTER 3 : MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY AND CAPITAL CONTROL :
AN EMERGINGMARKET ISSUE
3.1 Introduction
What is the challenge for the monetary and macro prudential policy in an
emerging economy when it become a small open economy during the global
economic turmoil? As a price taker, emerging economies are becoming subject
of the volatility of world interest rates and prices, in particular in the case of high
reliance on international trade. From financing channel, domestic saving rigid-
ity problem in the emerging economies has led to high dependency on foreign
investment, both direct and portfolio investment. Particularly, foreign portfolio
investment flows tend to amplify the pro-cyclical power of domestic business
cycle. This massive pro-cyclicality of business cycle tends to complicate policy
maker in the emerging economy to conduct their countercyclical policies.
One component of foreign portfolio investment is the cross-border bank
lending activities, mainly from banking industry in developed economies to
banking industry in emerging economies. From the origin, deeper financial
globalization and integration in the developed economies since 1990s, has led to
stronger competition for new market and profitability. Furthermore, the devel-
opment of financial intermediation alternative such as capital market and bond
market has created fiercer competition among developed economies banks. On
the other hand, as the recipient, emerging economies banks have grown rapidly
due to the massive financial liberalization and deregulation program since the
late 1980s. Along with this liberalization of capital account and combined with
93
taming barriers to entry to financial market , has created new investment oppor-
tunity to developed economies banks as an alternative to their local or regional
market.
In terms of literature collections on the determinants of cross-border bank
flows to emerging markets in periods of crises, they only have gained a little at-
tention so far. Earlier works are the combination of the traditional push, pull fac-
tors with financial stress indicators, and highlighted the importance of common
lender effects (Rijckeghem andWeder, 2003). Heid et al (2004) confirms such ef-
fects at the micro level and found that a sudden increase in risk aversion plays a
fundamental role in explaining cross-border lending in Europe. Study from the
World Bank (2008) showed that tensions in the global interbank market were
associated with lower growth of bank loans during the current global finan-
cial crisis. McGuire and Tarashev (2008) establishes a link between cross-border
loans and measures of bank health in host countries. Buch et al (2009) examined
the relationship between macroeconomic shocks and international banks’ for-
eign assets. They find that temporary overshooting and subsequent adjustment
over several quarters characterized bank responses.
However, the notion of managing these international capital flows, particu-
larly the cross-border loans to mitigate its negative impact to the economy has
just received attention lately. One strand of recent theoretical literature exam-
ines whether prudential capital controls are desirable from the perspective of
improving the overall domestic welfare of an emerging market economy when
there are booms and busts in capital flows (Korinek (2010), Korinek (2011),
Jeanne and Korinek (2010a)). They find that the optimal policy is the Pigou-
vian tax on capital inflows that make private market participants internalize
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their contributions to systemic risk in order to restore the efficiency of the de-
centralized market equilibrium. Bianchi (2011) quantifies the optimal tax in a
dynamic model of a small open economy calibrated to Argentina. He finds that
the relationship between the capital flows cycle and the optimal tax is highly
nonlinear. Shin (2010a) and Perotti and Suarez (2011) proposed to use a tax on
banks’ non-core liabilities as a tool for prudential regulation and such a tax was
introduced in Korea in August 2010. From the policy perspective, The rationale
for government management of capital inflows, and whether there is a need for
international rules of the game for those policies, have been identified as impor-
tant issues for the G20 discussions after the crisis, and IMF has produced several
analytical papers on those issues (IMF, 2011; Ostry et al., 2011). Finally, panel of
experts from CIEPR (Prasad, et al, 2012) showed that the pro-cyclical nature of
cross-border lending type flows has given rise to serious economic and finan-
cial instabilities thus effective regulations of this cross-border banking activity
is essential for domestic and global financial stability in a highly financially in-
tegrated world
The IMF document identifies three periods of rapid capital inflows in recent
decades: 1995Q4–1998Q2, a period associated with the Asian financial crisis;
2006Q4–2008Q2, which is associated with the credit boom that led to the Global
Financial Crises; and 2009Q3–2010Q2, the aftermath of the crisis. In the first two
capital inflows periods, the roles of cross-border bank lending were less than
20%. However, cross-border lending role surged during the period leading up
to the Lehman bankruptcy and its immediate aftermath (Azis and Shin, 2012).
Therefore, the changing nature of the global imbalances since the mid-1990s
is evident in those different stages of capital inflows. However, the last episode
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of capital inflows, leading up to the Global Financial Crises and the immedi-
ate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 is strongly
characterized by increasing bank-led flows to the emerging economy. Permis-
sive liquidity conditions in the US where wholesale market were transmitted
via the global banking system to the rest of the world, including emerging Asia.
This first wave of global liquidity manifested itself in the expanded bal-
ance sheets of banks resulting from increasing non-core liabilities that facili-
tated loans and risk-taking behavior. Even non-financial institutions took on
the attributes of financial firms, which is known as "financialization," as they
increased the size of their balance sheets relative to sales-generating activi-
ties, and therefore contributed to the massive pro-cyclicality of business cycle.
The currency appreciations impact further fueled capital flows into emerging
economies particularly Asia, as borrowers’ balance sheets were strengthened.
The second wave of global liquidity commenced in 2010, resulted from se-
ries of US Quantitative Easing (QE) policy as well as asset purchase policies of
advanced economy central banks. A massive amount of capital inflows surged
into emerging Asianmarkets searching for higher yield known as flight to quan-
tity event. As a result, the region’s capital markets across the board experi-
enced a boom as governments seized upon the availability of low-cost financ-
ing through the bond market. The share of foreign ownership in local currency
bond markets rose, as did banks’ sovereign bond holdings. The issuance of in-
ternational securities by both governments and private corporates in emerging
economies also increased rapidly amid super-low interest rates.
Rising bank led inflows or non-core liabilities since the first wave of capital
flows to emerging Asia post Lehman were highly pro-cyclical and constituted
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an important transmission channel of global liquidity shock to the this region.
This bank led inflows has strengthen the domestic financial cycles. Together
with domestic business cycles, they reduced the effectiveness of both emerging
Asia’s fiscal and monetary policy. Therefore, macro prudential policy takes the
important role with more targeted policy and various instruments. Form the
first chapter, macro prudential policy is considered superior over monetary pol-
icy in handing financial and asset price shocks. However, in that chapter, both
instruments, LTV and Countercyclical capital are on asset side. Therefore, in
this chapter, we introduce one instrument on the liabilities side, which is tax on
non-core liabilities. It imposes a levy on bank led inflows to discourage arbi-
trage investment such as carry trade
3.2 Stylized Facts on Increasing Non-Core Liabilities and Re-
versal Risk in Emerging Economies
Unusually strong cyclical and policy differences between advanced and emerg-
ing economies, and a gradual shift in portfolio allocation towards emerging
markets, have led to capital flows into emerging economies since the start of this
global financial crisis in the of mid-2009 (GFSR,2010, WEO, 2011). According to
BIS report in 2011, out of emerging economies, Asia-Pacific region appears to
be the most exposed area to the sudden capital flows withdrawals through the
banking system. Using data as of June 2011, close to two-thirds (63%) of all in-
ternational claims on residents of that region had a remaining maturity of less
than one year (Graph A, right-hand panel). In addition, cross-border claims
represented more than half (52%) of all foreign lending to the area (Graph A,
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left-hand panel).
This rapid resumption of capital inflows, which are large in the historical
context, has posed risks to macroeconomic and financial stability, and to ad-
dress these risks, policy makers have turned their attention to the use of macro-
prudential measures, as a complement to monetary policy.
Experience has shown that macroeconomic stability is not a sufficient con-
dition for financial stability. For example, prior to the crisis, global financial
imbalances were built up in advanced economies resulted from the chronic cur-
rent account deficit. However, the global financial crisis has created a massive
global financial cycle, including the massive deleveraging from financial inter-
mediaries in US and Europe. On the other hand, the expansionary global mon-
etary condition and strong domestic consumption have spurred a credit boom,
notably in Asia. In general, a credit boom, particularly to unproductive sec-
tor such as consumer credit is often accompanied by more risk taking behavior
that lead to the relaxation of credit standard. Moreover, the economic risk is
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heightened if the credit boom is driven by non-core liabilities such as borrow-
ing beyond retail or deposits. This shift of composition of assets and liabilities,
particularly towards non-core components, indicate more bank’s risk-taking be-
havior, which also encourages them to increase their leverage over the economic
cycle. This trend is now evident in Asia, where individual country scatterplots
of level changes of assets and liabilities show a greater slope for non-core lia-
bilities and assets (between 0.52 and 1.02) versus core liabilities and assets (be-
tween 0 and 0.41). After the global financial crisis, non-core liabilities appear to
be growing faster than core liabilities in selected Asian economies, particularly
in the emerging ones. The rapid growth can be explained by the fact that at
present, the size/level of non-core liabilities in these economies continue to be
small (e.g. low level-high growth), which places them at a less vulnerable posi-
tion when compared to an economy exhibiting a high level-high growth pattern
such as South Korea.
Figure 3.1: Bank’s Core and Non-Core Liabilities in Asia
Therefore, the idea of capital control to mitigate their volatility emerging
economies has gained renewed interest amidst the policy debate. This global
financial crisis has ignited this control as the crisis prevention tool. Historically,
few emerging economies such as Malaysia, Brazil, Chile, and Columbia had
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used capital controls back in the 1990s, as a crisis-management tool. However,
after the recent crisis, the motivation is more to prevent another crisis, not only
to manage them.
For example, Brazil introduced a 2-percent tax on all capital inflows except
FDI in late 2009. Subsequently the rate was increased to 6 percent in the late 2010
for bond finance, and the tax was extended to cover derivatives. In November
2009, Taiwan also introduced a ban on capital inflows for time deposits and in
June 2010, Korea introduced tax on non-core liabilities. In practice, the currency
forward and derivative positions of Korean banks and branches of foreign banks
are limited to only 50 percent of their equity. In its financial market, Korea
also imposed 14 percent withholding tax on foreign investors ‘earnings from
treasury bonds’.
In late 2010, Thailand has removed an exemption for foreigners on a 15 per-
cent tax on income earned on domestic bonds. Similarly, Indonesia also intro-
duced a relatively modest measure during that period, mainly through a com-
pulsory one-month minimum holding period on a domestic currency monetary
instrument known as central bank certificate or SBI.
Accordingly, from different degrees of intensity as well as the variety of in-
struments of capital control across emerging economies, there are several im-
portant questions related to the use of such controls, particularly the economic
rationale and the most appropriate circumstances. That issue will be covered in
the conclusion section.
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3.3 Model and Model Features
3.3.1 Model Features
Recent domestic boom and bust cycles are mainly characterized by asset price
cycles namely stock and housing. Stock market capitalization in the emerging
economy is relatively lower than the advanced one and affected few upper per-
centile of the society in the economy. However, the story of the global economic
crises following the housing boom in the advanced economy showed that cycle
in the housing price is deeper and structural. Seemingly consistent uptrend in
the housing price cycle has also activates risk taking channels, where the finan-
cial intermediary overlooked the increasing value of housing as the mortgage
collateral and less concern with the ability-to-repay from creditors. This cycle is
worsen with the increasing inflows to bank’s balance sheet in terms of non-core
liabilities, where bank’s balance sheets size increased relative to their business-
as-usual activities. The great contraction itself, stemming from housing bubble
eruption has cornered monetary and fiscal policy to their limit. It also ques-
tioned the effectiveness of DSGE model since it assumes the efficient financial
market and the absence of agency problems (Gali and Gertler, 2007). This ap-
proach has been challenged for its inability to capture real time bubbles and in-
sufficient tail-events mechanism to capture the severity of recession (Krugman
2009)
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Global Banking Glut and Flight to Quantity
The notion of the global banking glut was brought by Shin (2011) that is asso-
ciated with the cross-border banking activities in Europe where excess saving
in core countries (Germany, France) found their ways to periphery countries
(Spain, Ireland) and inflates the property price in the periphery countries. How-
ever, in a wider perspective, the cross-border banking activities to emerging
economies provide explanation for the large appreciation in emerging currency
as well as the stock market and housing market booming. These capital inflows
induced these emerging economies to experience capital surpluses, which was
offset by current account deficit.
Flight to quantity motive also justifies the global banking glut phenomenon
that global imbalances spillover to emerging economy following the global eco-
nomic crises. However, unlike the global banking glut, this hunger for higher
yield case increases the appetite for higher return assets in emerging economies.
It was mainly driven by the loss in developed economy stock market following
the abrupt bust in US mortgage market
This paper thus, tries to address those hypotheses that put more pro-cyclical
business cycles as well as the tail-events that amplify the crisis that standard
models failed to generate. One salient feature is the prominent role of hous-
ing investment. Combined with the mortgage lending mechanism, they form
a bundle for collateral constraint following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Hav-
ing this separate investment motive besides housing consumption enables us
to capture housing investment boom on top of housing consumption, due to
the excessive risk taking as well as the possibility of credit crunch in mortgage
lending activities.
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Combining open economy and financial friction should explain the dynam-
ics of cross-border banking in terms of non-core liabilities, including the distrib-
utive impact among household classes as well as the saving-portfolio/risk pre-
mium shocks. With this open economy setting, we can measure the spillovers
and the repercussion of trade and financial channel to domestic economy.
Distribution Impact
In this research, households classes are disaggregated into debtors, savers and
liquidity constraints household or non-Ricardian households. The latest repre-
sents fraction of households that do not have access to financial intermediary
activity as well as financial market. On the contrary, the first one represents
fraction of households that take out mortgage contract to finance their housing
investment. This corresponds to risk taking channels where bank concern more
to the housing value rather than payback ability of this household class. The
objective of having these three types of households is to measure the distribu-
tion impact of several economic and policy shocks. With the increasing capital
flows to the emerging asset market, it is suspected that increasing asset value
owned by Ricardian household widened income disparity. Therefore, to find
the optimal policy, we use comparison between Ricardian and non-Ricardian
household consumption dynamic.
Another difference with the first chapter of this essay is that we focus more
on credit to household than corporate, based on empirical reasoning that loans
provided by Indonesian banks are mostly mortgage loans while corporations
are able to utilize equity and bond issuance as well as their own funding from
retained earnings (Bank Indonesia Financing Survey, 2005).
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The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides a brief stylized
facts about the development of Indonesian banking sector with respect to the
accumulation of non-core liabilities Section three sets out the model description.
Section 4 discusses the data and estimation strategy. Section 5 discusses the
impulse response functions, emphasizing the effect of certain shocks associated
with the previously mentioned hypotheses, are able to emulate the stylized fact
of emerging economy, particularly Indonesia. Section 6 conducts the optimal
policy with respect optimal social welfare and the last section concludes.
To support this goal, the DSGEmodel we use in this chapter is a combination
of first and second chapter, although there are some differences. First, unlike in
the first chapter model where capital and insurance markets are regarded as be-
ing perfect (see Gali et al. (2007)), we allow for financial frictions in the form of
collateral constraints on borrowers with high rates of time preference following
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2007). In addition,
we expand the household into three types so that we can retain the financial fric-
tion between the savers and borrowers as well as the financial inclusion impact
from the non-Ricardian type of household. Another feature is to allow for bub-
bles, following Bernanke and Gertler (1999). The term "bubbles" is used loosely
to denote temporary but persistent deviations of asset prices from fundamental
values due, for example, to noise traders, herd behavior or waves of optimism
or pessimism. Our strategy for identifying bubbles empirically is similar to the
approach by Chirinko and Schaller (2001), using GMM estimation to check the
existence of stock market bubble in Japan. The closest work to this research
is Ratto et al (2010) which evaluates various competing explanations about the
recent boom bust cycle in the US economy.
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3.3.2 Model
We assume a small open economy that produces goods which are imperfect
substitutes to goods produced in the rest of the world. Households engage in
international financial markets and there is near perfect international capital
mobility. There are three production sectors, a final goods production sector
as well as investment goods producing sector and a housing construction sec-
tor. We further separate households into Ricardian households which have full
access to financial markets (savers), another Ricardian household s facing a col-
lateral constraint on their borrowing (borrowers) and nonRicardian or liquidity
constrained households which do not engage in financial markets. And there
is a monetary and fiscal authority, both following rules based business cycle
stabilization policies.
Households
Ricardian - Saver Household Ricardian households have full access to finan-
cial markets. They hold domestic government bonds(BGrt ) and bonds issued by
other domestic and foreign households(Brt ; B
F;r
t ), real capital (Kt ) used in the fi-
nal goods production sector as well as the stock of land (Ldt ) which is still avail-
able for building new houses. In addition they hold a stock of deposits (Dt) with
a financial intermediary who provides loans to credit constrained households.
The household receives income from labor, financial assets, rental income from
lending capital to firms, selling land to the residential construction sector plus
profit income from domestic firms owned by the household (final goods Prjt ,
residential construction PrHt and financial intermediaries Pr
B
t ). We assume that
Ricardian households owned the domestic firms. Income from labor is taxed
105
at rate tWt , and consumption is taxed at rate  c . In addition households pay
lump sum taxes TLS;rt . We assume that income from financial wealth is subject
to different types of risk. Domestic bonds and interest income from deposits
yield risk-free nominal return equal to it. Domestic and foreign bonds are sub-
ject to (stochastic) risk premium linked to net foreign indebtedness. An equity
premium on real assets arises because of uncertainty about the future value of
real assets. The optimization given by maximizing the objective function
maxEt
1X
k=0
r;tU(Crt ; 1  Lrt ; Hrt ) (SS:1)
followed by the intertemporal budget constraint
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The dynamic in the housing and land market takes the similar form as the
law of motion on capital such as :
Jt = Kt   (1  K)Kt 1
JH;rt = H
r   (1  H)Hrt 1
JLandt = Landt   (1 + gLt )Landt 1
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However, one strong assumption, is that land is the only scarce factor and
every period the land value increase with the rate of gLt . Therefore, capital and
house value will depreciate with different pace of K and H respectively.
Other characteristics of Ricardian household are the ability to invest on an-
other housing IH;rt besides their residential housing J
H;r
t . Therefore, the feature
to capture market ineffieciency in emerging market is the convex adjustment
cost related to household investment decision, both on capital and housingmar-
ket.
It = Jt

1 +
(K + u
I
t )
2

Jt
Kt

+
(I)
2
(Jt)
2 (SS:3)
IH;rt = J
H;r
t
"
1 +
(H + u
H
t )
2
 
JH;rt
Hrt
!#
+
(IH )
2
(JH;rt )
2 (SS:4)
The Lagrangian is constructed in real terms, while all price variables are
stated as a relative value over the GDP deflator.
The first order conditions for the Ricardian household’s problem are:
U rC;t
U rC;t 1 t
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Ricardian - Borrower Households Debtor households are still considered as
Ricardian households because of their ability to access financial market, in terms
of borrowing. They have a higher rate of time preference to represent their im-
patient behavior (c < r) and facing a collateral constraint ala Kiyotaki Moore
(1997) on their borrowing Lt.
The Lagrangian problems are given by
maxEt
1X
t=0
c
t
U c(Cct ; 1 N ct ; Hct ) (SS:10)
followed by the intertemporal budget constraint equation
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where c = loan to value ratio
Consumption, thus equal Euler form as follows :
U cC;t = Et
(1 + rLt )
c
(1 + (1 + rLt ) t)
pct
pct+1
U cC;t+1 (SS:12)
therefore the discount factor is dct =
(1+(1+rLt ) t)
(1+rLt )
= Et
UcC;t+1
c
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and their residential investment purchase is
pHt =
U cH;t
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1   t(1  H)ct
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1   t(1  H)ct
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Consumption and residential investment from borrower households are af-
fected by the collateral constraint. A tighter constraint lead them to shift con-
sumption from current to future and reducing residential investment by increas-
ing shadow capital costs of  t(1  Et ):Higher LTV reduces the impact of credit
tightening on residential investment, since in this case an increase in the capital
stock makes investment valuable for the household by increasing its borrowing
capacity.
Non-Ricardian household The last type of households is assumed not to have
access to financial market and capital market, thus they can neither save nor
borrow from bank and does not invest in capital. In terms of housing, it is
assumed that they live in non-permanent housing, built in an unclaimed land.
Therefore, there is no house purchasing or investment activity for them. As a
result, non-Ricardian households do not behave in a forward-looking manner
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and consume all of their wage payment as well as receiving subsidy according
to this optimization problem as follows :
maxEt
1X
t=0
c
t
U c(Cct ; 1 N ct ) (SS:14)
with corresponding non inter-temporal budget constraint such as
petC
e
t = wtN
e
t + T
e
t (SS:15)
The subsidy T et received by non-Ricardian households is similar as those
taxes paid by Ricardian households. They have substantially lower income than
Ricardians households due to the absence of financial and capital income.
There is a joint utility function for each type of labor i. It is assumed labor
are distributed equally over Ricardians and non-Ricardianswith their respective
population weights. Wage is set by optimizing a weighted average of the utility
functions of these households. The wage rule is the weighted average of the
marginal utility of leisure equal to a weighted average of the marginal utility of
consumption times the real wage of these three types of households, adjusted
for a wage mark up
scU csc Nc;t + s
rU rsr Nr;t + s
eU ese Ne;t
scU cc;t + s
rU rc;t + s
eU ec;t
=
wt
pct
t (SS:16)
where t is the wagemark up factor, with wage mark ups fluctuating around
1= which is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between different vari-
eties of labor services. The consumption wage is set as a mark up over the
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reservation wage. The reservation wage itself is a ratio of the marginal utility of
leisure to the marginal utility of consumption. If this ratio is equal to the con-
sumption wage, the household is indifferent between supplying an additional
unit of labor and spending the additional income on consumption and not in-
creasing labor supply.
Intermediate Goods Producer Intermediate goods producer use a Cobb Dou-
glas production function with Capital (Kt) and Labor (Lt) as inputs
Y = K1 t N

t Z
Y 
t (SS:17)
where Nt =
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1R
0
N
i  1

t di
 
 1
, following a Dixit-Stiglitz, CES aggregator to get
the aggregate labor supplied by individual households i. ZY t is an economy
wide shock and  is the degree of substitutability of labor. This intermedi-
ate goods producers issues shares at price qt as well as St 1 number of shares.
Eventually it pays profits prf to the saver households as the owner. We derive
profits from producer cash flow. Based on first chapter, we assume that inter-
mediate goods producer is subject to default on his bank loan (deft 1)to finance
their operation.
prf:St 1 = (Yt   wNt)  pItJt + (1 + rLt 1)Lt 1   (1  s) deft 1
 (1 + rDt 1)Dt 1   Lt
+Dt    (Dt   ldrLt)2 + qtSt (SS:18)
The value of the firm (V0) maximization of intermediate goods producer is
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as follows :
Max:V0 = E0
1X
t=0
tY
j=0
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In this framework, the bank collects core liabilities as the form of deposits
Dc, and non-core liabilities Dnc:It transform them into loans Lt In this case, a
regulator set such a constraint such that total deposits between core and non
core liabilities cannot exceed a fraction (ldr) of total loans. Furthermore ZJt is an
investment specific technology shock.
From that maximization problem we can derive optimal physical capital
pIt = YK;t + Et
(1  )
(1 + rEt )
p
ZJt
ZJt+1
(SS:20)
as well as optimal bank capital such as
(1  ldr) = ((1 + r
L
t )  (1 + rDt )ldr)
(1 + rEt )
(SS:21)
in these optimal conditions, both physical and bank capital are multiplied by
a stochastic discount factor 1
(1+rEt )
: Thus, the value of the firm of the intermediate
goods producer is equal to the share price qt and the outstanding shares St 1:.
Therefore, return on equity of this producer is profit prf plus capital gain and
the required return on equity is
(1 + rEt ) =
prft + Etqt+1
qt
(SS:22)
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Retail sector The retail sector or retailers, purchase wholesale goods and sell
them to households as consumption, in a monopolistically competitive market.
They face a quadratic price adjustment costs as one of the nominal rigidities in
this economy and in a symmetric equilibriumwhere inflation dynamics is given
by a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve as follows :
t = Et+1 +
1

mcwst
Pt
(SS:23)
Standard new Keynesian approach strictly follow a taylor type rule, how-
ever, in this research, we allow some degree of discrepancies using a discre-
tionary parameter zMt . Themonetary authority sets interest rates based on a Tay-
lor rule and responds to a certain degree of interest rate smoothing, the annual
consumer price inflation, the annual growth rate of output and discretionary
policy as follows :
it = it 1 + (1  )er + Tt + (t + t 1 + t 2 + t 3   4)4 +
 y(yt + yt 1 + yt 2 + yt 3   4y)
4
+ zMt (SS:24)
Rest of the World (RoW) Modeling countries inter-relation requires a greater
detail of agents behavior such as two countries model ala IMF GIMF model.
Another simplification is to model only parts of the economy. In this case, we
model that the RoW is a service economy and the ouput is produced using only
labor.Also, that service economy production is subject to permanent shocks to
technology. RoW households receive income from service production and they
save in the form of RoW and Indonesian currency denominated government
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bondsBF .Futhermore, their discount factor is subject to a stochastic shock Wt =
WZrowC;t . Eventually, They maximize an intertemporal utility function which
yields the following decision rule for consumption
U rowC;t t = Et

(1 + rwt )
pWt
pWt+1
Wt U
row
C;t t+1

(SS:25)
Two features of this model, global banking glut and flight to quantity, are
also presented in the section. The global banking glut shock stemming from
negative shock to ZrowC;t and the portfolio allocation decision yields the interest
parity condition, where rert is the real exchange rate as follows :
(1 + rwt ) = (1 + r
w
t )Z
BF
t Et

rert+1
rert

(SS:26)
where ZBFt is the stochastic risk premium between Indonesian and the RoW
assets. Moreover, flight to quantity represented by an increase in the demand fo
higher yield Indonesian assets would be indicated by a fall in ZBFt
In agregating the model, we assume an identical CES function between
households and corporations between Indonesia as the small open economy
and the rest of the world.This CES function applies for all types of goods for
both consumption and investment, Ai 2 fCi; I ig such as :
Ai =
" 
1  sM   ZMt
 1
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M 1
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M
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where sM is the share parameter, subject to a shock ZMt , while Ad
i and Af i
are the index of demand for a continuum of differentiated goods produced in
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Indonesia and the RoW. Also, a share s from total defaults def , representing
default on non-core liabilities, are born by household creditors from the rest of
the world. Finally the stock of net foreign assets is :
BFt = (1 + rt 1)B
F
t 1 +Xt   rertMt + s:deft 1 (SS:28)
Here, foreign firms act as a monopolistic competitive agent as well by setting
a mark up over the marginal cost. This foreign price is also exposed to shock
z
W
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Wp yWt   z
W
t (SS:29)
and the world interest rate is similar with domestic interest rate setting
which follows an auto-regressive mode for inflation deviation from the pre-
determine targets and output gap, such as
iWt = 
W it 1 + (1  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Market Clearing This section clears the model interlinkage, both domestic
and the rest of the world
Y dt = C
d
t + J
d
t + J
construct
t +Xt (SS:31)
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Y Wt = C
W;d
t +Mt (SS:32)
Non-Fundamental Shocks(Bubble Process) One important rule of solving
DSGE model is to have at least as many shocks as there are observed variables
in the model. Some shocks are considered as fundamental shock that come from
structural equations. Alternatively, shocks from arbitrage equation are consid-
ered as non-fundamental shocks or as bubbles. In modeling bubble process, we
follow Bernanke approach, (quote bernanke)where there is a fundamental value q
that represent an asset, that is equal to the current return divt with an additional
expected value for the next period, discounted with expected return r
q =
(divt+Et(qt+1))
(1 + rt)
(SS:33)
Furthermore, aside from this fundamental value divt, there is a non funda-
mental shock xt that follows a bubble process
xt+1 =
 a
prob

xt(1 + rt) + et
0
prob
(1  prob)
with a < 1
(1+r)
and the expected value of xt is Et(xt+1) = ax(1+r) . Next, we
define the market price st for another asset such where
st = qt + xt (SS:34)
That asset price also follow a "bubble" process such as
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((1 + rt)(1  (1  a)) st
xt
)st = divt+Et(st+1) (SS:35)
that equation implies that when non-fundamental process such as bubble
happen, the expected return of an asset in the next period will deviate from the
fundamental return r either by a positive or negative premium. Therefore, the
asset price will follow the equation of risk premium such as
riskpt =  (1  a)xt
st
(SS:36)
where the bubble factor x increase before the bubble process burst and diss-
apear afterward. This deviation from fundamental value concept also applies in
price variable for firm capital ownership, residential housing, land ownership
and exchange rate.
3.4 Model Solution and Estimation
Again, we apply Bayesian methods to estimate some parameters of the model,
using Indonesian quarterly data from 2000Q1 to 2012Q4 as the observed vari-
ables.
Similar to the previous chapter, we set the prior parameters value following
their theoretical bounds as well as relevant previous studies. Connecting the ob-
served variables with model variables, we apply measurements equations and
set the prior distribution. The solution of the model is expressed in a state-space
form and the likelihood function is computed using a Kalman Filter recursion.
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Then, the prior distribution is combined over the model’s parameters with the
likelihood function, applying the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain the
posterior distribution.
3.5 Impulse Response Function
Before the interpretation of the IRF, herewith the summary of the shocks in the
model. First shock is the massive capital inflows to the emerging market due to
increased savings in the Rest of the World Zcw or flight to quantity in favor of
higher yield in emerging market assets Zbf , Technology or productivity shocks,
expansionary monetary policy post global economic crisis Zm, asset price bub-
ble in the stock market Zv and housing market Zh, following the inflows. Next
shock is the excessive leverage in themortgagemarketZx, followed by systemic
shock from defaulting mortgage loans default. We also compare the effective-
ness of macro prudential regulation on asset side against one in liabilities side
where both policies are set endogenously. Asset sides is represented with LTV
regulation while liabilities sides is represented by tax on non-core liabilities.
First IRF (annex 1) is a productivity shock that have permanent impact to
the economy and its spillover impact to other economic sector resulted in in-
creases in all domestic demand components thus rise in GDP. However, this
shock did not capture the domestic economy boom post capital inflows, partic-
ularly explaining changes in the composition of domestic demand. Increasing
consumption combined with low coefficient of import substitute also resulted
in the fall in the trade balance.
Relax monetary policy implies more accommodative policy. To keep a stable
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the interest rate differential after the global economic crisis, emerging market
central bank has to reduce interest rate can account for some stylized features
of the boom. The reduction of interest rates favors investment growth over con-
sumption growth, it worsen the trade balance and leads to a real depreciation of
the US dollar. This makes it a relevant shock especially for the period 2002-2005.
A change in the loan to value ratio for debtors, either increase or decrease,
will also affect consumption and residential investment in the same direction,
particularly Ricardian households. However, corporate investment has the op-
posite sign because of interest rate effects. A loosening of credit constraints can
therefore only be a partial explanation of the boom since it suggests too much of
a co-movement between residential investment and private consumption and
it wrongly predicts a decline of corporate investment. This co-movement also
resulted to big discrepancy between the drop of housing investment but sta-
ble private consumption. For the same reason, there is a puzzle where credit
crunch for subprime borrowers (as a result from reduction of the loan to value
ratio) cannot explain the strong discrepancy between the fall of residential in-
vestment and the relative stability of private consumption.
Defaulting mortgage loans result in persistent financial losses in the corpo-
rate sector and are borne as income losses by saver household as the bank own-
ers. Especially the expectation of protracted losses and long lasting recapitaliza-
tion efforts of shareholders increases the required rate of return on assets, thus
increasing yield. With this increasing required yield on investment, financial
losses originating in the mortgage market adversely affects corporate invest-
ment with more expensive financing cost. This persistent negative investment
response leads to long lasting level shift of GDP, which seems to be a stylized
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fact of many financial crises. By reducing the debt burden on credit constrained
households it also stabilizes private consumption, but for the same reason it
does not generate the strong decline in residential investment
A Global saving glut leads to an increasing domestic bank lending as well
as real appreciation of the Rupiah and a fall of interest rates. It increases all do-
mestic demand components at similar magnitudes and causes a deterioration of
the trade balance. However, since most lending goes to ricardian households,
higher indebtedness of this type of households leads to a relatively rapid turn-
around of demand and the exchange rate. This feature could therefore partly
explain the depreciation following the appreciation until an exercise of tax on
non-core liabilites
A falling risk premium for the Indonesian assets attract capital flows to
search for higher yield (’flight to quantity’) It also lowers real interest rates in the
Indonesia and leads to an increase in both corporate and residential investment,
followed by a more modest increase in private consumption. Like in the previ-
ous case, this shock lowers interest rates in Indonesia and reduces demand for
Indonesian exports, in this case via an appreciation of the rupiah. Both shocks
taken together match qualitatively a large number of stylized facts.
3.6 Impact of Policy Choices on Social Welfare
To find an optimal choice of policies, instead of using a structural loss function,
we use the graphical comparison between Ricardian and Non-Ricardian house-
hold consumption or simply rich and poor households’ consumption, which is
empirically considered as one of the most important measure of social welfare.
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We only pick mortgage default as the domestic shock and the global banking
glut as the external shock.
From the simulation (Annex 2), it is clear that the macro prudential pol-
icy such as LTV is considered as the efficient tool for domestic shocks such as
increasing mortgage default, however, for cross-border shocks, such as global
banking glut, capital flow management is considered as the more effective way
to avoid massive amplification of financial cycle, which crate more systemic risk
and widened the income inequality
Empirically financialization does not have any implication on increasing so-
cial welfare since typically the Ricardian type of households who have access to
bank and capital market. Increasing non-core liabilities to emerging economies
(post Lehman) has increased bank source of funding. Households with access
to bank enjoyed the benefit from increasing bank risk-taking behavior that over-
looked the prospective mortgage market instead of household’s loan payback
ability. Historically emerging economy housing prices were rising faster than
the CPI index and after the bank-led inflows, the rate was doubled even cre-
ated a loophole that one household could owned more than one mortgage up to
nine mortgages contract. Following this phenomenon, several emerging econ-
omy exercised lending restriction policy for domestic households such as low-
ering LTV ratio. However as simulated in the IRF part that excessive funding at
bank balance sheet created opportunity to fund unregulated sector such corpo-
rate investment. Since saver household is the owner of corporations, increasing
profits for this type of Ricardian household will also widen the income inequal-
ity. Furthermore, from the increasing mortgage default simulation, decreasing
wealth effect in Ricardian households will also have a trickle down impact to
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non-Ricardian households through consumption channel. Therefore, from the
perspective of policy maker, managing the source of funding on banks using tax
on non-core liabilities is considered the optimal alternative for emerging econ-
omy.
3.7 Conclusion
The correct policy response to asset price booms such as housing price is an art
more than a science. From the set of policy available, macro prudential pol-
icy is more effective since it is more precisely targeted at specific risks such
as excessive leverage. Specifically, more heterogeneous approach can be ap-
plied to macro prudential policy by accommodating the specific circumstances
in different locations at different times. For example, different policy magni-
tude for different region or treatment on resident and non-resident, in the end,
will strengthen the resilience of the banking system as a whole. These measures
can be particularly helpful in countries with fixed or managed exchange rate
regimes or common market like European Union, or Asean Economic Commu-
nity where the impact of systemic risk is greater. However, some conditions
make these macro prudential measures less effective. First is the regulatory
arbitrage behavior from financial intermediary, known as the pecuniary exter-
nalities from incomplete market. It implies that the more targeted the macro
prudential policy, the more room for financial intermediaries to do arbitrage.
One solution is the more general rule such as capital requirement such as Basel
that covers all types of lending. For example, Basel III revision is to enhance
the risk sensitivity of capital requirements and increase the quality and quan-
tity of bank capital holding. However, it leads to second problem with the Basel
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risk weight system where this regulatory measure of bank portfolio risk really
catches the true portfolio risk. Any discrepancies will induced bank to invest in
risky assets, which maximize return, while reducing capital requirement (Val-
lascas and Hagendoff, 2013). Therefore, the use of liabilities instrument such
as tax on non-core liabilities will directly hit the source of the problem with
less opportunity for the receiver of that capital flows to do arbitrage decision in
the asset side. Finally, this tax on non core liabilites can also help to effectively
mitigate massive amplification of financial cycle that widened income equality
between households.
The next research agenda is to calculate what is the optimal tax on non core
liabilities. This optimal tax should have characteristics that fit a particular coun-
try and become a well-sctructured device that plays its role as a state-contingent
automatic stabilizer. From the political economic perspective, this tax rule is also
an effective pre-commitment device, helping the policy maker to withstand the
political pressures and the temptation to discount the capital control policy be-
cause of structural domestic saving-invesment gap issues. In the end, all of the
policy instruments in these essays are cyclical instruments but the best protec-
tion against global challenges comes from structural strengths Accomodative
policies may be useful as short-term medicine but only structural policies can
restore economies in the long term.
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Appendix 3.1 
Impulse Response 
LY: log of GDP; 
LC: log of consumption; 
LCCC: log of consumption (Non Ricardian); 
LCNLC: log of consumption (borrower); 
LCEQUITY: log of consumption (saver); 
LI: log of corporate investment; 
LIHOUSE: log of residential investment; 
LIHOUSECC: log of residential investment (borrowers); 
LIHOUSENLC: log of residential investment (savers); 
DEBTCC: Stock of mortgage loans; 
R: real interest rate; 
REQUITY: required return on equity 
LER: log of real exchange rate; 
LWR: log of real wage rate; 
LL: log of hours worked; 
TBYN: trade balance to GDP ratio; 
LPHOUSEPY: log of house prices to price of final output; 
GXW: Growth rate of RoW; 
REQUITY: required return on equity 
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